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Wisconsin, Illinois, Ontario - Three Roads to
Marital Property Law Reform*
RICHARD W. BARTKE**
LORI A. ZURVALEC***
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the
property rights of married persons.' Most of the discussion and re-
form has been in the context of divorce,' although property rights
upon death have also been the subject of debate and legislation.'
The question of the rights of married couples to each other's ac-
quisitions during the continuation of the marriage relationship has
received less attention, although this is changing. Community
* This article has been published, in a shorter and not entirely up-to-date form, as The
Low, Middle and High Road to Marital Property Law Reform in Common Law
Jurisdictions, 7 COMM. PROP. J. 200 (1980).
** Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1956, University of Wash-
ington; LL.M. 1967, Yale University.
*** Member of the Michigan State Bar. B.G.S. 1976, University of Michigan; J.D. 1979,
Wayne State University.
1. Bartke, Marital Sharing - Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 GEo. L. J. 1131 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Bartke, Marital Sharing]; Bartke, Marital Property Law Reform: Ca-
nadian Style, 25 AM. J. Comp. L. 46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bartke, Marital Property];
Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TuL.
L. REv. 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Glendon, Matrimonial Property]; Glendon, Is There
a Future For Separate Property?, 8 FAM. L. Q. 315 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Glendon,
Future]; Hahlo, Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 11 Os-
GOODE HALL L. J. 455 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hahlo; Johnston, Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality,
47 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1033 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Johnston]; Krauskopf, Marital Property
at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. Rev. 157 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Krauskopfl;
Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Property, Divorce and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Kulzer]; Power, Well Begun is Half Done: Community Property In
Missouri, 21 ST. Louis U. L. J. 308 (1977); Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of
Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prager, Sharing
Principles]; Wenig, Sex, Property and Probate, 9 REAL PROP., PROS. & TR. J. 642 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Wenig].
2. Bartke, Marital Property, supra note 1, at 65-68; Krauskopf, supra note 1; Kulzer,
supra note 1.
3. Bartke, Marital Property, supra note 1, at 69-71; Haskell, The Premarital Estate
Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C. L. REv. 415 (1979); Wenig, supra note 1, at 645-652;
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 - 2-207, 8 U.L.A. 331-40 (1972 & Supp. 1980).
4. Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1131-51; Bartke, Marital Property, supra
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property states have dealt with this question in recent years, with
the result of substantial statutory amendment in those states to
provide for co-equal rights of the spouses in the common
property.'
This article will undertake a discussion of the need for and goals
of reform in non-community property states. We will determine
the function of marital property rights during the ongoing marital
relationship, and will suggest the form of statutory changes neces-
sary to preserve those rights. First, we will give a brief historical
overview of the legal, economic and social forces which are the ba-
sis for the present concerns regarding marital property rights.
Next, a detailed examination of the statutory schemes of three ju-
risdictions will be presented. Two of these jurisdictions, Ontario
and Illinois,6 have recently amended their statutes, and the third
jurisdiction, Wisconsin, is in the process of developing an inte-
grated statutory scheme. 7 The three approaches are basically dis-
tinct, and represent different perceptions of the public policy is-
sues involved and the goals to be achieved in marital property
rights. These approaches provide the necessary context for our rec-
ommendations and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
(A) Common Law Background of Marital Property Rights
Under the common law of England, which forms the basis of
most states' legal systems,8 a married woman had very little indi-
note 1; Glendon, Future, supra note 1; Prager, Sharing Principles, supra note 1.
5. See generally Bartke, The Reform of the Community Property System of Louisiana
- A Response to its Critics, 54 Tu.. L. REv. 294 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bartke, Louisi-
ana Reform]; Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1135-37; Bartke, Community Prop-
erty Law Reform in the United States and in Canada - A Comparison and Critique, 50
TUL. L. REv. 213, 227-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bartke, Community Reform].
6. The Family Law Reform Act 1978, STAT. ONT. 1978, c. 2; Illinois Marriage and Disso-
lution of Marriage Act, Ill. P.A. 80-923 (1977), codified in ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, §§ 501-515
(Smith-Hurd 1980).
7. The bill was introduced on Dec. 5, 1979; Wis. A.B. 1090 (1979). On Jan. 15, 1980, the
Assembly Judiciary Committee held a day long public hearing. As a result of the hearings
considerable amendments were made in the form of Assembly Substitute Amendment 4 to
the bill, dated Feb. 19, 1980, which will be reintroduced in the fall of 1980; whenever in this
article Wis. A.B. 1090 is cited, it refers to amendment 4. See also Irish, A Common Law
State Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5 COMM. PROP. J. 227 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Irish].
8. This article is primarily concerned with the 42 common law states. The eight commu-
nity property states have a history of their own which is interesting, instructive and cer-
tainly germane to the discussion of the Wisconsin proposals. It is essentially outside the
[Vol. 12
19801 Marital Property Law Reform
vidual legal personality. 9 According to Sir William Blackstone, hus-
bands and wives were one and the husband was the one.' 0 The le-
gal personality of the wife during marriage was submerged and
incorporated into that of the husband. In the context of property
this meant that the husband was the owner of all of his wife's chat-
tels and had the use and benefit of her real property." The wife's
only interest in her husband's property was her dower, which dur-
ing their joint lifetimes was a mere expectancy rather than a prop-
erty right. Dower depended entirely on the wife surviving her
husband.'"
scope of this article, to be mentioned only in appropriate places. For extended discussions
see generally W. DR FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed.
1971) (only comprehensive volume on the subject which is already outdated and heavily
oriented towards historical origins); W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1975 & Supp. 1977) (only comprehensive casebook); Pugh, The Span-
ish Community of Gains in 1803; Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REv. 1 (1969) (best
short treatment of Spanish sources) [hereinafter cited as Pugh]; Bartke, Marital Sharing,
supra note 1, at 1135-47; Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L.
Rzv. 729 (1974) (an outstanding study of the law of a single state) [hereinafter cited as
Cross, Washington Community]; Johanson, The Migrating Client: Estate Planning for the
Couple from a Community Property State, in U. MIAMI 9TH ANN. INST. ON EST. PLAN. 8-1
(1975) (an excellent short treatment of community property for lawyers in common law
states); Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community
Property System, 1849-1975, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Prager, Per-
sistence] (very useful study of historical developments in a single state); Symposium, Equal
Management of Community Property, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 133 (1977).
9. See Hahlo, supra note 1, at 463-66; Johnston, supra note 1, at 1044-47 for a detailed
discussion.
10. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, ComMErNrARiss* 430. This does not seem to have been the case in
the middle ages. See Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property
In England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 64-66 (1979).
11. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 433. Feminist Susan B. Anthony recognized that
such unequal and unfair treatment of women could not continue indefinitely, commenting
that "[als young women become educated in the industries of the world, thereby earning the
sweetness of independent bread, it will be ... impossible for them to accept ... that 'hus-
band and wife are one, and that one the husband' ... ." Anthony, Homes of Single Wo-
men, in THE STANTON-ANTHONY READER (E. DuBois ed. 1979). Anthony's observation has
become a reflection of current trends. See text accompanying notes 17-31, infra.
12. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 129-139. The statement must be tempered by the
reflection that at least as early as the end of the seventeenth century, through the interven-
tion of equity, a married woman could have almost complete control over her own property.
See, e.g., Countess of Sutherland v. Northmore, 21 Eng. Rep. 188 (Ch. 1729); Duke of Marl-
borough v. Lord Godolphin, 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750). This result was achieved by the so-
called marriage settlement and the use of the equitable devices of trusts and powers of
appointment. E.g., Hahlo, supra note 1, at 463-64; Johnston, supra note 1, at 1052-56; see
note 16 infra. This was only the case to any extent, however, among the landed aristocracy
of England where the marriage settlement was a part of elaborate family arrangements and
was designed to ensure that land would remain in the direct family line. E.g., A. DICEY,
LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND 383 (2d ed. 1914). It was
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As thus conceived, the common law recognized husbands and
wives as a type of economic unit. By giving husbands the control,
enjoyment and virtual ownership of their wives' assets, however,
this conception of an economic unit was highly discriminatory to
women. Although the law pooled the resources of the marriage os-
tensibly for the spouses' mutual benefit, in effect, only husbands
were enriched. Nevertheless, the concept of marriage as an eco-
nomic unit existed in England and was followed in the United
States until the nineteenth century.
(B) Married Women's Property Acts
Legislative reforms took place in the nineteenth century which
altered the common law rules." These reforms began in the United
States"' and much later spread to England and, eventually, to Ca-
nada.1 5 The reform completely separated the spouses in the eco-
nomic sphere and granted to a married woman the right to her own
property." If she had property, this gave the married woman con-
siderably greater economic independence.1 7 At that time, however,
most women were working in the home or on the family farm.
They received no compensation and had few expectations of gifts
or inheritances. The reforms, therefore, accomplished nothing for
never used to any great degree among the English middle classes and was virtually unknown
in the colonies and in the states.
13. See Hahlo, supra note 1, at 463-66; Johnston, supra note 1, at 1057-89 for general
discussions.
14. The first statute seems to have been adopted in Mississippi, Laws Miss. [1839], ch.
26. See Comment, Husband and Wife - Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of
1839, 42 MICH. L. REv. 1110 (1944), although some of the current literature still perpetuates
the myth that it was a New York invention, e.g., Comment, The Origins of Law Reform:
The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement and its Contri-
bution to the Passage of the Early Women's Property Acts, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 683 (1975).
15. For a chronology of the English and Ontario statutes, see Bartke, Marital Property,
supra note 1, at 50-51.
16. The reform movement essentially enshrined as a legal rule the equitable pattern de-
veloped through the marriage settlement. The marriage settlement involved a transfer in
trust for the "separate use" of a married woman or one who was about to marry. At first this
involved actual trusts with third party trustees. By 1725, however, the two words "separate
use" constituted a husband trustee. When this was combined with powers of appointment, a
married woman could dispose of her property either on death or even during her lifetime. A
marriage settlement could also involve an antenuptual agreement which, while unenforce-
able at law after marriage because of the unity of spouses, was fully enforceable in equity.
See generally Johnston, supra note 1, at 1052-56; see also note 12 supra.
17. Generally, the source of such property would be a gift or an inheritance from her
own family. Property might also have been acquired as a gift from her husband. Mister, Law
of Married Women, 20 AM. L. RaEv. 356, 364-65 (1886).
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them and still left them propertyless.' The more invidious effect
of his legislation, however, was the creation of the notion that the
spouses are strangers in the economic sphere with no interest in
each other's acquisitions. The effect of this economic separation
was compounded by the view that the childrearing and housekeep-
ing contributions of the wife were assigned no economic value, so
that division of property upon death of the spouse or dissolution of
the marriage often was inequitable.'9 Courts followed the title the-
18. Glendon, Future, supra note 1, at 319 n. 12.
19. Kulzer, supra note 1.
The lack of recognition given to the wife's work in the home in the nineteenth century is
presently reflected in the social security and tax laws. The social security laws have been
challenged in the courts. See Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). The theories behind the holdings in both these cases are
rather interesting. In the former, social security benefits were paid to the deceased woman
worker's children but not to her widower. In the latter, Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance benefits were paid to a widow automatically, but only to a widower if
he received at least one-half of his support from his wife. In both cases the court focused on
the discrimination against the deceased female worker, rather than the surviving male
spouse.
That both Weinberger and Goldfarb involved challenges by males to the social security
system does not mean that the system does not discriminate against women who work
outside or within the home. At present a w6man who works must make an election between
the social security benefits she has earned or those based upon her husband's earnings.
Homemakers receive no benefits in their own right, no disability protection and receive no
dependents' benefits if the marriage ends in divorce before ten years have passed. Cohen,
Social Security: Current Myths and Reality - The Need for Its Preservation and Reform,
25 WAYNE L. Rav. 1419, 1442-43 (1979); Witte, Your Social Security - Don't Leave Home
Without It, Ms., October 1979, at 85.
See also Wangler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1540 (1980) which involved essen-
tially the same issue in the context of Missouri worker's compensation law. The action was
by the widower of a female worker killed in a work related accident. In order to be entitled
to benefits he would have had to prove dependency, while a widow would be entitled to
benefits without such proof. The distinction was held constitutionally invalid.
Furthermore, the federal income tax laws were "reformed" in 1969 in such a way that
where both spouses work, the married couple pays more income tax than their counterparts
who merely live together, or than traditional one-earner couples. Tax Reform Act of 1969,
P.L. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678, (added new subsection (d) to I.R.C. § 1, the separate
schedule for married persons filing separate returns, as well as amending subsection (c) for
unmarried individuals). The principal income tax provisions applicable to married persons
are: I.R.C. §§ 1, 37, 41, 43, 44, 44A, 46, 48, 50A, 58, 63, 101, 105, 120, 151, 163, 170, 179, 213,
217, 280, 401, 408, 505, 672, 674, 677, 913, 1030, 1211, 1233, 1244, 1251, 1302, 1303, 1304,
1348, 1371, 1402.
For an exhaustive and up to date analysis on tax matters see Wenig, Marital Status and
Taxes, in UNMAR=D CouPLEs Amnq Tm LAW 189 (G. Douthwaite ed. 1979) (from which the
tabulation of I.R.C. sections is borrowed). See also McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Per-
sonal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. Rxv. 469 (1980); Rich-
ards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under the Present Income Tax Laws, 49
TA XEs 526 (1971).
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ory20 of property rights, reasoning that it was the husband who
earned the money used to pay for the property and since title was
held in his name, the property was his.2 The title theory of owner-
ship often meant that the husband received all property upon dis-
solution of the marriage.
(C) Economic and Social Changes Compound the Need for
Further Reform
During the period of legislative reform, the role of women in so-
ciety began to change. During the Civil War, many women served
as nurses on the battlefields, and also worked behind the lines as
part of the army of office workers in Washington, D.C. 2 In the
decades following the war, women, supported by a growing femi-
nist movement and by their wartime experiences, expanded into
new fields. In addition to the traditional job of school teaching,
women were employed as factory workers, clericals, and in rarer
20. The "title theory" is based on the notion that property rights depend exclusively on
the state of the title and that the only contributions worthy of legal protection are those
expressed in terms of money or its equivalent. It fosters the notion that it is mine if I paid
for it or if title stands in my name. It tells the homemaker that her contributions are not
worthy of recognition in the eyes of the law.
21. Examples of mechanical applications of the title theory, which deprived even work-
ing wives of their rightful property interest, can be found in recent cases. Norris v. Norris,
16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181 (1974); Wirth v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1971); Murdock v. Murdock, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R.3d 367 (1973). In Wirth, the
husband suggested a crash savings program whereby his salary would be invested and the
wife's would be used to pay family expenses. All investments were in the husband's name
only. The wife's claim to one-half of the property on the theory of constructive trust was
denied by the court, which said: "A constructive trust is a vehicle for 'fraud rectifying'....
There may be a moral judgment that can be made on the basis of respondent's conduct and
the imperfectly expressed intention of some possible future benefit to appellant, but that is
not enough to set the court in motion." 38 A.D.2d at 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
Such application of the title theory has arisen in other contexts as well. In a recent New
York suit by a landlord for the possession of an apartment, the trial court held that the
tenant's wife was not a necessary party. Her legal position was equated to that of the ten-
ant's children, servants, boarders and guests. Papacostapolos v. Pontone, [1979] 7 HousING
& Dzv. REP. (BNA) 397 (Civ. Ct. N.Y., Housing Part, Aug. 22, 1979).
Some rights were accorded women by the concept of dower, which was retained even after
married women's property acts were passed. E.g., 2 R. POWmL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
1 209-213, at 140-170.25 (2d ed. Supp. 1979). This was supplemented or superseded by the
concept of forced share added to many probate codes. See, e.g., Bartke, Marital Property,
supra note 1, at 69-71. These rights, however, did nothing to help the woman separated
from her spouse by divorce rather than death. See generally Lake, Divorcees: The New
Poor, McCALL's, Sept., 1976, at 18.
22. J. SOCHEN, HES'TORY 160-67 (1974); Davies, Woman's Place Is at the Typewriter:
The Feminization of the Clerical Labor Force 6-8 (1974) (originally printed in 8 Radical
America, No. 4 (July-August, 1974) (hereinafter cited as Davies, Feminization).
19801 Marital Property Law Reform
instances, as professionals." By 1890, 3.7 million women of work-
ing age either had a job or were looking for one" and 13.9 percent
of all gainfully employed women were married.2 5 The number of
married women workers rose to 28.9 percent by 1930.6 Thus, while
a married woman's place was still primarily in her home, it was not
uncommon for her to be also working outside of the home. 7
At present, approximately 41 million women work outside of the
home.' 8 It has been predicted that in the near future, women who
stay at home will be in the minority.2" This strong, steady influx of
23. Davies, Feminization, supra note 22, at 5-6. See S. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER
PLACE (1978), which gives an outline of changing ideas and practices from 1870 to the pre-
sent, for an examination of society's changing policy toward women and the "proper" role of
women. See also Goodman, Women's Job Status Needs a Lift, Detroit News, Oct. 18, 1979,
at 23-A, col. 4, for changes in the scholastic ranking of women entering the traditional fields
of teaching and nursing.
24. Women at Work, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
25. Federal Woman's Program, Office of Personnel Management, Putting Women in
Their Place 12 (1979).
26. Id. at 13.
27. See J. KEEPs, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WORK (1971); N.
SEIFER, ABSENT FROM THE MAJORITY: WORKING CLASS WOMEN IN AMERICA (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Seifer]; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, 1975 HANDBOOK OF WOMEN WORK-
ERS (Bulletin 297). See also the Wall Street Journal's eight part series on Women at Work:
Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1; id. Aug. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 1; id. Sept. 5, 1978, at 1,
col. 1; id. Sept. 8, 1978, at 1, col. 1; id. Sept. 13, 1978, at 1, col 1.; id. Sept. 15, 1978, at 1, col.
1; id. Sept. 22, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Woman to Woman, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
28. This figure represents almost half of all women between the ages of 18 and 64. It has
been noted that "[m]arried women form by far the largest group of women who work. In
1971, they represented nearly 60 %, followed by single women - 22%; widowed women - 8%;
divorced women - 6%; and separated women - 5%" SEFER, supra note 23, at 28. Further-
more, "[wiorking wives contributed an average of a quarter to a third of the family income.
In 1970, the median income for a family of four was $9,175 if the wife did not work, $11,940
if she worked part-time or part-year, and $13,960 if she worked full-time all year. More than
50 percent of wives who worked in 1972 had children under 18." Id. For the latest statistics
on the increasing participation of women in the workforce, see U.S. Bureau of Census, Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States 394, No. 647 (100th ed. 1979) [hereinafter Statistical
Abstract].
There continues to be, however, a large gap between the earnings of men and women
which is not closing. Statistical Abstract, supra note 28, at 420, No. 691. This is true even in
the case of very highly educated women. Frank, Why Women Earn Less: The Theory and
Estimation of Differential Overqualification, 68 AM. EcON. REV. 360 (1978), advances the
argument that one of the reasons why highly qualified women earn less than men is that, in
most marriages, the decision of where to locate is made with respect to the husband's career.
For similar conclusions see Marwell, Rosenfeld & Spilerman, Geographic Constraints on
Women's Careers in Academia, 205 SCIENCE 1225 (Sept. 21, 1979); Roark, Women in Sci-
ence: Unequal Pay, Unsold Ideas, and, Sometimes, Unhappy Marriages, Chronicle of
Higher Education, Apr. 21, 1980, at 3. See also Sowell, Status Versus Behavior, 1979 WASH.
U. L. Q. 179, 183-85, where a distinction is made between academic women who never mar-
ried and those who married, as far as advancement and earnings are concerned.
29. Women at Work, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The erosion of the family
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women into the workforce has a profound effect upon the marital
relationship, 0 particularly upon the sources and amount of the
spouses' property.3 1
The problems of determining what constitutes marital property
and how rights in that property are to be shared or divided be-
tween the couple have raised the most difficulties for the legal sys-
tem. Some jurisdictions have endeavored to change their outmoded
laws and to adopt new marital regimes that would reflect the
evolution of marriage. We turn now to an examination of three
such attempts.
III. ONTARIO: THE Low ROAD
(A) Historical Background
The law of Ontario affecting married women was derived from
English law.3 2 The first reforms of that law consisted of the adop-
tion of a comprehensive Married Women's Property Act 3 modeled
after one passed two years earlier at Westminster.3 4 The reforms,
income due to inflation is accelerating the process, Detroit News, Sept. 26, 1979, at 10-G,
col. 1; Wall St. J. (Midwest ed.), May 30, 1980, at 3, col. 4.In inflationary periods, many families need a second paycheck to enable them to meet the
basic necessities of life. See Detroit News, Sept. 26, 1979, at 10-G, col. 1. For other couples,
the second paycheck provides an affluence that would not be otherwise available. See The
Two-Paycheck Life, MONEY MAO., January, 1979, 34-64; Women at Work: The Rich Get
Richer, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
30. See S mn, supra note 27, at 42-49, for a discussion of the impact that the influx of
women into the workforce has on a working class marriage. A special report in Money maga-
zine investigating "The Two-Paycheck Life" gives a thorough view of the various "stresses
and opportunities" brought on by both spouses working. See MONEY MAO., January, 1979 at
34-64. See also THE SuBnL REvoLuTION: WOMEN AT WORK (R. Smith ed. 1979). For a dis-
cussion of some of these stresses, see, e.g., Wall St. J. (Midwest ed.), Jan. 14, 1980, at 1, col.
1. See What Should a Mother do About Her Career?, Wall St. J. (Midwest ed.), Mar. 21,
1980, at 16, col. 3, for differing responses of two career women to motherhood. For responses
from readers, see id., Apr. 7, 1980, at 17, col. 1. See also C. BIRO, THE TwO-PAYCHECK MAR-
BlACK How WOMEN AT WORK ARE CHANGING LWE IN AMERICA (1979); F. HALL & D. HALL,
Ti Two-Csam CoupLz (1979).
31. See MONEY MAG., supra note 29, at 34-43.
32. Upper Canada (now Ontario) was created as a separate province in 1791. 31 GEO. 3,
c. 31 (1791). The first act adopted by the new provincial legislature was The Property and
Civil Rights Act, 32 GRo. 3, c. 1 (Upper Can. 1792), now codified in REv. STAT. ONT. 1970, c.
367, which declared that in matters of controversy relating to property and civil rights the
law of England as of Oct. 15, 1792, should govern.
33. Married Women's Property Act, 47 Vict., c. 19 (ONT. 1884). See Bartke, Marital
Property, supra note 1, at 51 nn. 29-36 for a citation to the various amendments. An earlier
act, Married Women's Property Act 1872, 35 Vict., c. 16 (ONT. 1872), was very limited in
scope and superceded by the 1884 enactment.
34. Married Women's Property Act, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (1882). Until 1897 Ontario
closely followed the English lead; see Bartke, Marital Property, supra note 1, at 51. From
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however, perpetuated many of the disabilities of coverture. 85 Even
vestiges of the concept of the unity of husbands and wives were
maintained." Married women did not have full contractual rights
and the statute specifically provided that their property rights
could be curtailed or eliminated by express provisions in a mar-
riage settlement.8 7 As the divorce rate increased during the twenti-
eth century, the resulting inequities became pronounced. A num-
ber of cases indicate that a woman who devoted her life to home
and family was exceedingly vulnerable, because she acquired no as-
sets in her own name and therefore received little property upon
divorce.38
(B) The Reform Efforts
In 1974, after ten years of study, the Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission reported that the province's law of marital property rights
was no longer responsive to the needs of society.89 The law failed
to recognize the economic side of marriage and tended to penalize
the stay-at-home spouse." The Commission recommended a de-
ferred sharing approach,"1 which envisaged that during the exis-
tence of the ongoing relationship, the parties would own their
property in severalty unless they specifically put title in joint
names.4 2 They would essentially retain full power of disposition ex-
cept for certain limitations, particularly in the area of unilateral
then on, however, the statutory law of Ontario remained essentially static until the enact-
ment of The Family Law Reform Act 1975, § 6, STAT. ONT. 1975, c. 41, which repealed §§ 2-
11 and § 13 of the Married Women's Property Act, REv. STAT. ONT. 1970, c. 262.
35. The term "coverture" was a contraction of the Norman-French term feme-covert or
covered woman, referring to the conditions of a married woman who was under the cover or
protection of her lord and husband. It came to denote the state of legal disability of a mar-
ried woman who was one with her husband. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 430.
36. These vestiges were eliminated by The Family Law Reform Act 1975, § 1(1), STAT.
ONT. 1975, c. 41.
37. Rzv. STAT. ONT., 1970, c. 262, §§ 3(1), 4, 10 & 13, repealed by The Family Law Re-
form Act 1975, § 6, STAT. ONT. 1975, c. 41. There were no corresponding provisions for
husbands.
38. See Bartke, Martial Property, supra note 1, at 52-55.
39. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT ON FAMILY LAW, PART IV FAMILY PROP-
ERTY LAW XI-XII, 5-8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ontario Report]. The commission was
created by The Ontario Law Reform Act 1964, Rav. STAT. ONT. 1970, c. 321.
40. Ontario Report, supra note 39, at 5-8. See also discussion in Payne & Wuester, Fam-
ily Law: Proposals for Reform, STUDIES ON FAMILY LAW, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CA-
NADA 253, 264-71 (1975).
41. Ontario Report, supra note 39, at 189-95, Recommendations 3-53.
42. Id. at 189, 208, Recommendations 3, 151.
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gifts.43 Upon termination of the marriage, a monetary balance
would be struck and an equalizing payment made by the more af-
fluent spouse." The manner of computation, however, differed de-
pending upon whether the marriage terminated upon the death of
a spouse or by divorce. Where the death of a spouse terminated
the marriage, compensating payment would be due only if the less
affluent spouse was the survivor.' Thus, the scheme suggested by
the Commission would apply in full force only upon divorce.' 6
Despite its faults and weaknesses, 7 the proposal constituted a
considerable improvement over the then-existing law of Ontario.
The proposal could have been built upon and strengthened, creat-
ing a basis for a workable scheme of economic sharing. Instead, a
very different bill was eventually passed," which went through sev-
eral changes of text'9 and barely survived a provincial election. 50
43. Id. at 192, Recommendations 34-38. The proposal was to prohibit "excessive gifts"
which were defined as either donations other than "usual and customary gifts" or transfers
found by a court to be "for a consideration . . . clearly inadequate."
44. Id. at 189, 191, Recommendations 4, 27-29.
45. Id. at 88-90.
46. Id. at 192, Recommendations 39-40.
47. See Bartke, Marital Property, supra note 1, at 55-62; Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, Or How
Not to Reform Marital Property Rights, 9 OrrAWA L. REV. 321, 327-29 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Bartke, Ontario Bill 6] for a detailed discussion of the report.
48. The Family Law Reform Act 1978, STAT. ONr. 1978, c. 2 [hereinafter cited as ONT.
1978 STAT.]. The first commentary on this act has now appeared. Comment, An Examina-
tion of Section 4 of the (Ontario) Family Law Reform Act 1978, 11 OTTAWA L. REv. 371
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Examination of Section 4].
The basic pattern of the Ontario act has been followed in two other provinces: Family
Relations Act, STAT. B.C., 1978, c. 20, as amended by Attorney-General Statutes Amend-
ment Act, 1979, §§ 22-32, STAT. B.C. 1979, c. 2; The Marital Property Act, STAT. MAN. 1978,
c. 24. But see The Matrimonial Property Act, STAT. SASK. 1979, c. M-6.1, which takes a
much broader approach.
49. The legislation was first introduced in 1976 as Bill 140, 3d Sess., 30th Leg. Ont. 1976
[hereinafter cited as Bill 1401. This bill was criticized in Bankier, An Act to Reform the Law
Respecting Property Rights and Support Obligations Between Married Persons and in
Other Family Relationships: A Critique, 1 FAM. L. REV. 33 (1978); Baxter, Family Law
Reform - Ontario, 55 CAN. B. REv. 187 (1977). It was reintroduced in altered form in 1977
as Bill 6, 4th Sess., 30th Leg. Ont. 1977 [hereinafter cited as Bill 6]. This bill was criticized
in Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra note 47. The final form was introduced as Bill 59, 2d Sess.
31st Leg. Ont. 1978.
50. Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra note 47, at 322 n. 10.
Shortly after the submission of the report of the Law Reform Commission, a provincial
election resulted in the formation of a new government. The successor attorney general in-
troduced Bill 140, supra note 49, with the official explanation that although the recommen-
dations of the Law Reform Commission represented certain benefits, there was no public
support for them. MINIsRY OF Tim A'ORNEv GENERAL (ONTAwo) FAMmV LAW REFORM 5
(1976).
What was not disclosed was that a conference organized by the Ontario Status of Women
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(C) The Statute: High Expectations and Meager Results
The Family Law Reform Act 1978 states and restates in its Pre-
amble that it "recognizes marriage as a form of partnership. '
This objective, however, is never realized within the actual content
of the legislation. Official comments clearly indicate that the part-
nership concept is applicable only in cases of divorce and not of
death.62 Upon divorce or declaration of nullity, each spouse is enti-
tled to an equal share of the family assets."3
The section introducing the concept of family assets constitutes
the cornerstone of the legislation. 4 The label "family assets" does
not refer to property acquired during the marriage as a result of
the contribution of the spouses. Rather, family assets are com-
posed of a heterogenous group of items, whether owned before
marriage or acquired thereafter. The common characteristic of
these items is that they are ordinarily used or enjoyed by both
spouses, or by their children, while the spouses are residing to-
gether. Such a description indicates that investment and income-
Council was convened in Toronto on October 25, 26 and 27, 1974, which brought together
approximately 400 women delegates from all over the province. During this conference a
questionnaire was passed to the delegates. Among the questions asked was: "4. Apart from
the matrimonial home, should assets acquired during marriage be shared by the spouses
throughout the marriage - equally regardless of financial contribution?" This question was
answered in the affirmative by 77% of the delegates. FAIR SHARE CONFERENcE, FINAL RE-
PORT ON "SHORT" QUESTIONNAIRE at 1(a). This tabulation was not publicized. Information
about the conference, as well as a copy of the questionnaire and the tabulation of the an-
swers, was obtained from Professor Jennifer K. Bankier, now on the faculty of Wayne State
University Law School, who was a voting delegate to the conference. (A copy of the ques-
tionnaire and answers is on file with the library of Loyola University of Chicago Law
School).
51. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at the second "Whereas" clause. The third
"Whereas" clause employs the term "partnership" in connection with the settlement of af-
fairs of the spouses on breakdown.
52. Bill 140 was published in pamphlet form with official comments by the Ministry of
the Attorney General. The comments state: "We do not propose to make the family assets
system apply on the death of either spouse ...." FAMILY LAW REFORM 8 (1976). Death of
either of the spouses is not mentioned in the statute, but it has now been so construed to
exclude termination of the marriage by death of a spouse. Nevile v. Beckstead, 11 R.F.L.2d
190 (Ont. Cty. Ct. 1979).
53. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at § 4(1). The comments further state that these
rights are personal between the spouses. Id. § 4(3). If an action for divorce or declaration of
nullity was commenced before the death of a spouse, it may be continued by or against his
or her estate. Id. This provision did not appear in either Bill 140 or Bill 6 and its justifica-
tion in this context is questionable. See discussion in Examination of Section 4, supra note
48, at 389-90.
54. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at § 3(b).
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producing properties are excluded, 5 limiting family asset acquisi-
tions to household goods and recreational equipment. The
problems of construction are compounded by the requirement that
the assets must ordinarily be used and enjoyed by both spouses.
Therefore, any items used or enjoyed by only one spouse, should
they not share the same pasttimes or interests, are excluded."' This
section also specifically indicates that the parties may, by a domes-
tic contract, 7 exclude items which otherwise would fit the category
of family assets.55 There is, however, no express provision allowing
them to expand the category to include assets excluded by statute.
The statutory provision that each spouse is entitled upon disso-
lution to have the family assets divided in equal shares, notwith-
standing the ownership thereof," can be nullified however by an-
other section sanctioning the exercise of virtually unlimited
judicial discretion in the divison of assets.60 On the other hand,
55. See Kastran v. Kastran, 7 R.F.L.2d 318 (Ont. Unif. Farn. Ct. 1978) (life insurance
and business not family assets); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 10 R.F.L.2d 385 (Ont. Cty. Ct. 1979)
(stocks and bonds not family assets); Ramboer v. Ramboer, 11 R.F.L.2d 320 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
1979) (retirement plan not family asset); Moore v. Moore, 14 R.F.L.2d 63 (Ont. Unif. Fam.
Ct. 1980) (deferred profit-sharing plan not family asset); St. Germain v. St. Germain, 14
R.F.L.2d 186 (Ont. Ct. App. 1980) (pension not family asset). Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra
note 47, at 334-35. See also Examination of Section 4, supra note 48, at 383-84.
56. Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra note 47, at 330. See also Examination of Section 4,
supra note 48, at 380-83. See Bregman v. Bregman, 7 R.F.L.2d 201 (ONr. SuP. CT. 1978)
(boat used by husband only not family asset, oriental rugs displayed in home family assets
but those kept by husband in a trunk not family assets).
57. Domestic contract is defined in ONr. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at § 51:
(1) Two persons may enter into an agreement, before their marriage or during their mar-
riage while cohabiting, in which they agree on their respective rights and obligations under
the marriage or upon separation or the annulment or dissolution of the marriage or upon
death, including,
(a) ownership in or division of property;
(b) support obligations;
(c) the right to direct the education and moral training of their children, but not
the right to custody of or access to their children; and
(d) any other matter in the settlement of their affairs.
(2) Any provision in a marriage contract purporting to limit the rights of a spouse under
Part III in respect to a matrimonial home is void.
58. Id. § 3(b): ". . . but does not include property that the spouses have agreed by a
domestic contract is not to be included in the family assets;..." No explanation is given of
the public policy reasons behind this particular provision.
59. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at § 4(1).
60. Id. § 4(4).
"The court may make a division of family assets resulting in shares that are not equal
where the court is of the opinion that a division of the family assets in equal shares would
be inequitable, having regard to,
(a) any agreement other than a domestic contract;
(b) the duration of the period of cohabitation under the marriage;
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non-family assets, even though acquired during the union, can be
awarded to the non-owner spouse only under very limited circum-
stances.61 When read together, these two sections may completely
deprive a stay-at-home spouse of the means of support. Income-
producing assets of considerable value may have been acquired by
the working spouse during the marriage. Because such assets are
not characterized as family assets, judicial discretion is severely
limited and an award of the assets to the stay-at-home spouse is
unlikely. As enacted, the statute would have been considerably
better if it had simply provided for broad judicial discretion in the
award of both types of assets.6 2
Another objectionable feature of the Act is that it treats persons
at different ends of the economic spectrum unequally,6" placing a
premium on the manipulation of acquisitions. "' The less affluent
are more likely to hold assets falling within the definition of family
(c) the duration of the period during which the spouses have lived separate and apart;
(d) the date when the property was acquired;
(e) the extent to which property was acquired by one spouse by inheritance or by gift; or
(f) any other circumstance relating to the acquisition, disposition, preservation, mainte-
nance, improvement or use of property rendering it inequitable for the division of family
assets to be in equal shares."
The discretion of the judge was originally reasonably limited. See Bill 140, § 4(2); Bill 6, §
4(3). Such discretion, however, was continuously extended as the various drafts were criti-
cized. See Bankier, supra note 49, at 34-35; Baxter, supra note 49, at 196. Section 4(4) was
construed rather narrowly in Silverstein v. Silverstein, 1 R.F.L.2d 239 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1978).
See also O'Reilly v. O'Reilly, 9 R.F.L.2d 1 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1979); Calvert v. Calvert, 9
R.F.L.2d 162 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1979).
61. The discretion to distribute other assets is very severely limited. ONTARiO 1978 STAT.,
supra note 56, at § 4(6):
"The court shall make a division of any property that is not a family asset where,
(a) a spouse has unreasonably impoverished [sic] the family assets; or
(b) the result of a division of the family assets would be inequitable in all the circum-
stances, . .."
This section has been construed very narrowly. See, e.g., Youngblut v. Youngblut, 11
R.F.L.2d 249 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1979) (wife's work at home and outside home, with financial
contribution, not enough to give her an interest in a farm); C. v. C. (No. 1), 11 R.F.L.2d 356
(Ont. Cty. Ct. 1979); Peterson v. Peterson, 12 R.F.L.2d 319 (Ont. High Ct. 1979).
62. See Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra note 47, at 324-25.
63. Id. at 332-35.
64. See O'Reilly v. O'Reilly, 9 R.F.L.2d 1 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1979) (husband opened a bank
account unknown to wife in which he deposited bulk of his earnings and with which he
purchased a partnership interest. Such an investment is classified as a non-family asset.
Wife was partly compensated in a miserly fashion by an unequal division of family assets);
Bregman v. Bregman, 7 R.F.L.2d 201 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1978) (oriental rugs purchased by hus-
band for investment and kept in a trunk were held to be not family assets); Sabot v. Sabot,
15 R.F.L.2d 225 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct. 1980) (saving certificate purchased with money from
family account, not family asset, wife entitled to one-half under § 8; profit sharing plan, not
family asset).
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assets than are the affluent. Because the less affluent typically ac-
cumulate only negligible amounts of income-producing or invest-
ment property,65 all of their holdings will be governed by the Act.
At the higher end of the economic spectrum, more and more sur-
plus will be generated which will then be invested, presumably for
the benefit of both spouses. These investments, however, do not
qualify under the definition of family assets and will not be
divisable as such.66 It is, therefore, possible for a business or pro-
fessional person to defeat the rights of his or her spouse by the way
in which he or she spends disposable income. This may be particu-
larly offensive in those situations where one of the grounds for dis-
cord is the fact that the spouse employed outside of the home ref-
uses to properly provide for the needs of the family, while
feathering his or her nest. Thus, not only is the titleholding, em-
ployed-out-of-the-home spouse favored,67 but the Act, in effect, pe-
65. In many instances their surplus will be represented by a savings account which will
be employed for all purposes and thus is likely to qualify as a family asset under ONT. 1978
STAT., supra note 48, at § 3(b)(i). They are also the ones least likely to appreciate the legal
consequences of maintaining multiple accounts.
66. This is qualified somewhat by the very limited discretion vested in the court to di-
vide property which is not a family asset, found in ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, § 4(6)(b);
See note 61 supra for the language of this section. See also remarks of Karen Weiler, of the
Department of the Ontario Attorney General and one of the principal drafters of the legisla-
tion, in Toronto, on Nov. 4, 1977, at a joint meeting of the Family Law Section of the New
York State Bar Ass'n and Family Law Section of the Candian Bar Ass'n (Ontario) at 23-34.
The proceedings were recorded and transcribed by Prof. Mary Moers Wenig, who graciously
made a copy available to us (letter dated Feb. 27, 1978, from Mary Moers Wenig to Richard
W. Bartke), copies of which are on file in the library of Loyola University of Chicago Law
School [hereinafter cited as Weiler Remarks]. Ms. Weiler stated:
Now debt and assets concept is obviously a limited one and it is important if
we are going to have this approach that we give the court another form of discre-
tion and that is the discretion to reach out and to order sharing, transfer, or
division of non-family assets and that is in the situation where it would be ineq-
uitable again to simply divide the family assets. The court cannot only vary the
proportions of sharing of family assets but can also reach out into other property
and order that other property be shared where it is appropriate to do so. The
considerations are the same ones as I've outlined to you and perhaps a couple of
examples could illustrate. One of the situations that may come to mind is the
situation where you have a house in gross value worth $250,000. The children are
all grown up. That house is sold and the parties move into an apartment. The
marriage breaks down shortly after the parties have moved into that apartment.
At that point in time I don't think it would be unrealistic at all to expect that
the judge would exercise his discretion and say, notwithstanding the fact that
the house was in the husband's name, or that he has now put the entire proceeds
of the sale into Bell Telephone and Telegraph stocks, this ought to be shared
and to exercise his discretion to order a sharing of that other property. (Empha-
sis added).
67. In this connection see Ont. 1978 Stat., supra note 48, § 8, which specifically empha-
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nalizes a generous spouse and rewards a selfish one.
The Ontario Act is additionally deficient in that the absence of
any restrictions on the lifetime disposition by gratuitous title
makes it possible for one spouse to effectively defeat the rights of
the other spouse by collusive and other gifts. There is much poten-
tial for abuse, for example, in the situation of second or third mar-
riages where children from a prior union can be given "family as-
sets" without formal retention of any rights by the donor, in trust
or otherwise."
There are, finally, elaborate, ineffective provisions dealing with
the matrimonial home.9  The only redeeming feature of these sec-
tions is that they constitute the only instance in which the unilat-
eral right of disposition by one spouse or the other is curtailed.70
These criticisms by no means cover all of the public policy and
technical imperfections of the Act, but they suffice to indicate that
the Act is essentially a failure in terms of its own stated goals, and
may actually leave the stay-at-home spouse worse off than she or
he was before.7 1 The Act concentrates on the wrong assets, employ-
ing use rather than acquisition during the union as a touchstone.
By excluding income-producing items from the sphere of sharing,
with the pointed exception of monetary contributions, it makes a
mockery of the concept of marriage as a partnership. The Act per-
sizes monetary contributions, and further minimizes the nonmonetary contributions that
the legislation was ostensibly designed to recognize. See FAMILY LAW REFORM, supra note
59, st 1. O'Reilly v. O'Reilly, 9 R.F.L.2d 1 (ONT. SUP. CT. 1979) (holding that a working wife
and mother should be treated differently); Leatherdale v. Leatherdale, 14 R.F.L.2d 263
(ONT. SuP. CT. 1980) (monetary contribution, by wife to husband's non-family assets);
Badley v. Badley, 14 R.F.L.2d 345 (ONT. CTn. CT. 1980); Sandy v. Sandy, 15 R.F.L.2d 79
(Ont. Sup. Ct. 1980) (keeping house, raising twelve children and working on farm, not
enough to invoke § 8).
68. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, § 3(b)(iii) & (iv), includes property over which cer-
tain powers have been retained within the definition of family assets. See also id. § 4(6)(a).
69. A matrimonial home is included in the definition of family assets, id. § 3(b), and
then expanded in Part III, §§ 38-49. Compare Calvert v. Calvert, 9 R.F.L.2d 162 (ONT. Sup.
CT. 1979) (matrimonial home partly purchased with wife's inheritance; this did not entitle
her to larger share), with King v. King, 9 R.F.L.2d 294 (ONT. SUP. CT. 1979) (a home owned
by husband before marriage, which had lasted two years was unequally divided).
70. ONT. 1978 STAT., supra note 48, at § 42. This, however, should be qualified by the
realization that the designation does not attach to the proceeds of the sale or other disposi-
tion of the matrimonial home. See Wailer Remarks, supra, note 66. See Devcic v. Devcic, 13
R.F.L.2d 243 (Ont. Unif. Faro. Ct. 1980), published after this article was written.
71. E.g., Baxter, supra note 49, at 195-96. Examination of Section 4, supra note 48, at
390, concludes that, "[a]lthough only some of the issues which may potentially be raised
pursuant to this section [4] have been discussed, it is clear that this section will not be a
stranger to Ontario's courts."
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mits excessive judicial discretion in the area of family assets and
far too little judicial discretion elsewhere, thus glorifying title and
monetary contribution at the expense of other considerations. For
all of these reasons the Ontario Act cannot be recommended as a
model to emulate for determining marital property rights.
IV. ILLINOIS: THE MIDDLE GROUND
(A) Pre-Amendment Law
Illinois, like Ontario, originally followed English common law. As
did most common law states, it adopted a married woman's prop-
erty act in the nineteenth century.7 Consequently, a married
couple under Illinois law had no legal interest in each other's prop-
erty, whether acquired before or during the marriage, unless the
property was specifically designated as jointly owned. This concept
reflected an early presumption that all goods and chattels in the
marital home and in joint possession were the property of the hus-
band. 3 It was held much later that certain household property,
which the spouses treated as common, would be classified as prop-
erty held in tenancy in common. 4
Suits brought under the marital property act often resulted in
inconsistent holdings, due to a substantial delegation of discretion
to the courts. Presumptions of either several or joint ownership
could be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, and it was the judge
who weighed the evidence in most cases. 76 This created a degree of
uncertainty as to the rights of each spouse in property acquired by
72. An Act to Revise the Law in Relation to Husband and Wife, approved Mar. 30, 1874,
as amended, codified in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-22 (Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp. 1979).
See H. CLARK, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 7.2 (2d ed. 1974); J. SOCHEN, HERSTORY 133-34 (1974)
for a discussion of the Act's background. For an analysis of the Illinois law prior to amend-
ment, see Glendon, Matrimonial Property, supra, note 1, at 52-63.
73. See Rice v. Sayles, 23 Ill. App. 189 (1886); Hanchett v. Rice, 22 Ill. App. 442 (1886).
74. In re Estate of Smith, 90 II. App. 2d 305, 232 N.E.2d 310 (1967).
75. Compare Norris v. Norris, 16 IM. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181 (1974) (virtually all
property awarded to husband, strictly on the basis of title; wife's work on farm does not
raise "special equities") with Gerhardt v. Gerhardt, 18 Ill. App. 3d 583, 310 N.E.2d 224
(1974) (award of virtually all property to husband reversed under guise of title determina-
tion; wife's work on farm establishes "special equities").
76. The court in In re Estate of Smith, 90 Ill. App. 2d 305, 232 N.E.2d 310 (1967), noted
that the presumption of common ownership of household goods could be rebutted by evi-
dence other than the source of funds. Id. at 308, 232 N.E.2d at 312. There was also a rebut-
table presumption of a gift whenever an investment was made by one spouse in their joint
names. See Baker v. Baker, 412 II. 511, 107 N.E.2d 711 (1952); Nickoloff v. Nickoloff, 384
Ill. 377, 51 N.E.2d 565 (1943); Harnois v. Harnois, 10 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 295 N.E.2d 511
(1973).
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funds contributed by both parties. Questions of ownership could be
resolved only by litigation and by looking to the couple's intent at
the time that the property was acquired. Since the acquisition of
property during marriage is rarely discussed in terms of who will
own what in the event of dissolution, the determination of intent
too often resulted in inequitable judgments. 77
Inequitable property division was particularly likely in divorce
proceedings.7 8 Under the Illinois Divorce Act,79 courts had broad
equitable powers in the division of property. Occasionally this
meant that a wife who had stayed at home and had made no
financial contribution would be given her rightful share of the mar-
ital property,80 but more often it did not.81 Able to see value only
in terms of dollars contributed and not services and support ren-
dered, the courts frequently awarded property consistent with the
title theory of ownership rather than with principles of equity in
mind."5
77. This high degree of unpredictability of the outcome of a determination of ownership
of marital property was criticized in Glendon, Matrimonial Property, supra note 1, at 52, 55
n.107.
78. E.g., Norris v. Norris, 16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181 (1974). Stotlar v. Stotlar,
50 Ill. App. 3d 790, 365 N.E.2d 1097 (1977).
79. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, § 18 (Smith-Hurd 1976) (repealed by 1977 ILL. LAWS, ch. 80-
923, § 901).
80. E.g., Gerhardt v. Gerhardt, 18 Ill. App. 3d 583, 310 N.E.2d 224 (1974).
81. Women rarely received credit for work in the home. The court in Everett v. Everett
noted that:
It is also well established that the rights or interests that one spouse has in the
property of the other by virtue of the marriage relation alone will not justify a
conveyance under section 17 [citations omitted] but it must be alleged and proved
by the spouse seeking a part or all of the property in the name of the other that
he or she has furnished valuable consideration such as money or services other
than those normally performed in the marriage relation which has directly or indi-
rectly been used to acquire or enhance the value of the property.
25 Il. 2d 342, 347-48, 185 N.E.2d 201, 204-05 (1962)(emphasis added).
82. See Norris v. Norris, 16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181 (1974) (all but the wife's
personal property awarded to husband in whose name title was held, despite her substantial
contributions, which were labeled "traditional"); Stotlar v. Stotlar, 50 111. App. 3d 790, 365
N.E.2d 1097 (1977) (reversing the trial court, securities in husband's name purchased with
funds from joint checking account, did not raise special equities in wife's favor); Spalding v.
Spalding, 361 11. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935); Musgrave v. Musgrave, 38 11. App. 3d 532, 347
N.E.2d 831 (1976); Overton v. Overton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 287 N.E.2d 47 (1972); Gerhardt
v. Gerhardt, 18 Ill. App. 3d 658, 310 N.E.2d 224 (1974).
It should be noted that this narrow and unpredictable stance toward a wife's contribu-
tions was also reflected in the statutory law. The Married Women's Property Act of 1874
stated that "neither husband nor wife shall be entitled to recover any compensation for any
labor performed or services rendered for the other, whether in the management of property
or otherwise." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (repealed by 1977 Il. Laws, ch.
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When it became apparent that reform was necessary, Illinois leg-
islators chose to disregard problems arising during an ongoing mar-
riage or at its termination by the death of one of the spouses. In-
stead, they focused solely on the need to correct injustices in the
area of divorce. Their solution was embodied in the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act.' 3
(B) The Present Law and Its Effect
The 1977 Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act was in-
tended to be a comprehensive divorce reform measure. 84 The Act
does not affect property interests during the marriage or upon ter-
mination by death." Several new concepts were introduced into Il-
linois law by the Act, which was essentially based on the 1970 uni-
form act.8"
The Act defines marital property as "all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage. '8 It turns away from
adherence to the title theory of ownership by expressly providing
80-923, § 901). For a construction of this section, see Lellos v. Lellos, 25 Ill. App. 2d 201, 166
N.E.2d 639 (1960).
83. Illinois 80th General Assembly Reg. Session, Pub. Act 80-923, codified in, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The law became effective on October 1, 1977.
84. The Act retains some existing Illinois domestic relations law which does not affect
marital property rights but which is worth briefly noting here. The law does not abolish
fault divorce, but allows the plaintiff to merely plead one of the designated grounds without
alleging underlying facts. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 403 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The law also
allows either or both parties to initiate dissolution proceedings. Id. § 403(b). Section 602(b)
directs the court not to consider the conduct of a parent that does not affect the relation-
ship between the child and parent when awarding custody. Id. § 602(b). For a discussion of
the entire Act, see Kalcheim, Marital Property, Tax Ramifications, and Maintenance:
Practice Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act - A Comparative
Study, 66 ILL. B. J. 324 (1978) (Pt. 1); 66 ILL. B. J. 388 (1978) (Pt. 2); Auerbach, An Intro-
duction to the New Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 66 ILL. B. J. 132
(1977).
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1980). See also, Kujawinski v. Kujawin-
ski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 573, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (1978), noted in, 1978 S. ILL. U. L. J. 598. In
this respect the Illinois approach is similar to Ontario's Chalmers v. Copfer, 7 R.F.L.2d 393
(Ont. Cty. Ct. 1978) (rights under the Act personal on divorce only and cannot be invoked
by creditors); Nevile v. Beckstead, 11 R.F.L.2d 190 (Ont. Cty. Ct. 1979) (Act inapplicable on
death).
86. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307. 9A U.L.A. 143-44 (1979) as originally
adopted in 1970, rather than the 1973 amendment; see Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 IMI. App.
3d 513, 516 n.1, 386 N.E.2d 517, 520 n.1 (1979).
Illinois is used as a comparison state in this article because its pre-reform law was particu-
larly objectionable, while its reform efforts were similar to many others, e.g. Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
and Pennsylvania.
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
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that any property qualifying as marital property will be so consid-
ered regardless of title.88 There are, however, six exceptions to the
broad classification of marital property,"9 and the presumption
that property acquired after marriage is marital property can be
overcome by a showing that it was obtained in one of the six enu-
merated ways.90
Although divorce in Illinois is still based on fault, under the Act
the division of marital property is to be made without considering
marital misconduct.9" Marital property is to be divided in "just
proportions" taking into account "all relevant factors.' 92 These
factors include ten enumerated considerations, one of which recog-
nizes the contributions of a spouse as a homemaker.93 These provi-
sions for the determination and division of marital property are to
be read together with the provisions for the award of maintenance.
A maintenance order can be granted only if the spouse seeking the
order, among other factors, 4 lacks sufficient property, including
his or her share of the marital property, to provide for reasonable
needs.'"
A glaring deficiency of the Act is that it attempts to resolve the
issues raised by the division of property at dissolution in a legal
vacuum, without co-ordinating the division with the law governing
an ongoing marriage or the termination of the marriage by death of
one of the spouses. The Illinois Supreme Court has noted that the
88. Id. § 503(b). See discussion in Schubert v. Schubert, 66 Ill. App. 3d 29, 383 N.E.2d
266 (1978).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980):
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
Assets falling within one of these six exceptions are known as "non-marital property."
90. Id. § 503(b).
91. Id. § 503(c).
92. Id. For a discussion of dissipation of marital assets, see Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68
Ill. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517 (1979).
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980).
94. Id. § 504(a)(1)(2)(3). See generally, Shaver v. Shaver, 56 I1. App. 3d 845, 372 N.E.2d
696 (1978).
95. The Act also contains provisions for child support, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 505
(Smith-Hurd 1980), for representation of minor or dependent children of the marriage, id. §
506, and for attorney's fees, id. § 508, see generally Fox v. Fox, 56 Ill. App. 3d 446, 371
N.E.2d 1254 (1978); Thomas v. Thomas, 56 Ill. App. 3d 806, 372 N.E.2d 679 (1978).
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Act does not regulate the respective property interests of the
spouses during the existence of the marriage. 6 Married persons
continue to own separate property and are not restrained from dis-
posing of it during marriage in whatever way they choose. This
omission leaves each spouse vulnerable to actions against their in-
terests by the other spouse as the marital relationship deterio-
rates.98 Few marriages end overnight. The disintegration is gener-
ally slow, so that ample time is available for transfers of property
before dissolution proceedings commence. Some measure of protec-
tion is necessary for spouses during the ongoing legal
relationship. 99
Thus, Illinois still insists on treating the spouses as strangers in
the economic sphere during the ongoing marital relationship. Al-
though some commentators have compared this concept to com-
munity property concepts 00 or to a commercial partnership
model, 10 1 such an analogy overlooks an essential component in the
law of both the community property states and of commercial
partnerships: the basic equality of the partners, from the beginning
of their relationship until its end.10 2 In the community property
states the property rights of the parties arise from the marital rela-
tionship itself,03 while the common law states treat such rights as
96. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 573, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (1978). In
Kujawinski, the retrospective application of § 503 of the Act was upheld against a challenge
of unconstitutional denial of due process and impairment of the obligation of contracts,
precisely because no property interest vested in the other spouse until the dissolution pro-
ceedings. Therefore, the property-owning spouse's interests were not impaired. Id.
97. Id. Note, 1978 S. ILL. U.L. J. 598, 609, considers this to be dictum.
98. The statute includes "dissipation" as one of the criteria to be considered in the divi-
sion of marital property. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980); see
Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 Ill. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517 (1979). Thus, under some cir-
cumstances, compensation in the form of unequal division may be made, provided there is
enough property left. If, however, the transfers exhaust the marital estate, the statute as
construed provides no remedy. Cf. Baker v. Baker, 201 Neb. 409, 411, 267 N.W.2d 756, 758
(1978) (spouse compensated from remaining assets for property transferred gratuitously).
99. Note, 1978 S. ILL. U.L. J. 598, 605-09, discusses several adverse tax consequences of
such a position, but does not mention protection of the non-title holding spouse.
100. Kalcheim, supra note 84, at 325-28. The difference, however, is perceived in Note,
1978 S. ILL. U.L. J. 598, 602. See also In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 712, 388
N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (1979) (Trapp, J., dissenting). (The legislature did not intend to adopt
community property concepts).
101. Kalcheim, supra note 84, at 325; Auerbach, supra note 84, at 137.
102. See sources cited in notes 5 and 8 supra.
103. Recent amendments in all community property states, other than Texas, took the
final step by destroying the earnings-management link. Prager, Persistence, supra note 8, at
79-80. See also Bartke, Louisiana Reform, supra note 5, at 315.
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a function of title and monetary contribution.0 4 Under the Illinois
Act the possibility exists for a court to order an equal distribution
of marital assets, but there is no legislative directive to do so.10
Rather, the courts have been provided only a laundry list of factors
to take into account in exercising their discretion.'" This has led
to conflicting decisions, 0 7 and will continue to do so in the future
as the courts grapple with changing concepts of marriage in the
context of inadequate and unresponsive legislation. 08 Further-
more, the uncertainty of results is likely to foster litigation, rather
than encourage settlement.
Finally, division of property upon divorce may vary significantly
from division upon death of the spouse. Upon divorce, the spouse
104. E.g., Norris v. Norris, 16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181 (1974); Wirth v. Wirth, 38
A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971); Murdock v. Murdock, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R.3d
367 (1973).
105. See In re Marriage of McMahon, 82 Il. App. 3d 1126, 403 N.E.2d 730 (1980), where
a division of marital property, 60% to the husband and 40% to the wife, was affirmed as not
a manifest abuse of discretion. Justice Craven dissented stating that under § 503(c) there
should be a presumption of equal division. See also In re Marriage of Thornquist, 79 II.
App. 3d 791, 399 N.E.2d 176 (1979), where a contention that § 503(c) was unconstitutionally
vague was rejected.
106. In Stallings v. Stallings, 75 Ill. App. 3d 96, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (1979), the court stated:
Next, with respect to the trial court's award of all marital property to Wife, Hus-
band claims that a 50-50 split based on Illinois partnership law should have been
made by the court. We summarily dismiss that proposition. Had the legislature
intended marital property to be so divided at divorce, it would not have provided
Section 503(c) of the Act. The legislature's intention was obviously that marital
property be equitably divided, based upon the factors specified in Section 503
Id. at 100, 393 N.E.2d at 1067. While an inflexible rule of equal division is undesirable there
should be a statutory presumption of equal division.
107. Compare Capogreco v. Capogreco, 61 111. App. 3d 512, 516, 378 N.E.2d 279, 282
(1978) (equitable apportionment of new statute leads, in this case, to same result as prior
law's emphasis on title and special equities); with Schubert v. Schubert, 66 Ill. App. 3d 29,
383 N.E.2d 266 (1978) (state of title no longer necessarily controlling).
108. E.g., Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 404 N.E.2d 306 (1980) (personal injury settle-
ment marital property); Lucas v. Lucas, 83 11. App. 3d 606, 404 N.E.2d 545 (1980) (workers'
compensation award marital property); In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 388
N.E.2d 1289 (1979) (Military retirement pay held to be marital property to be divided. Jus-
tice Trapp dissented and had considerable problems with the concepts and the language of
the statute.); In re Marriage of Glidden, 71 111. App. 3d 96, 389 N.E.2d 657 (1979) (Husband
made improvements to wife's nonmarital property. The court held that proper construction
of the statute is to take the improvements into account in the division of marital property,
no interest in the res.); In re Marriage of Evans, 85 IlI. App. 3d 260, 406 N.E. 2d 916 (1980)
(pension rights held to be marital property); In re Marriage of Smith, 84 Ill. App. 3d 446,
405 N.E. 2d 884 (1980) (disability pension held to be marital property); compare the con-
struction of essentially the same statute by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Tib-
betts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76-77 (Me. 1979), which held that the property became pro
tanto marital.
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may be awarded marital property 09 while probate property is dis-
tributed upon death.1 The size of the probate estate depends in
part on the extent to which will substitutes are used.1 ' The com-
parison is further complicated by the fact that the surviving
spouse's intestate share1' is not identical to the forced share if the
will is renounced. 13
The Illinois statute is far superior to the Ontario effort. It is not
a model to emulate, however, because the legislative scheme is in-
complete and responds to only one aspect of an area in need of
integrated reform. What is designated as potential marital prop-
erty for distribution upon divorce is not equivalent to probate
property for distribution upon death, and there is no protection of
marital property interests before dissolution. Therefore, the Illinois
statute cannot be recommended as a model to be followed in other
states.
109. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd 1980). See text accompanying note 81
supra.
110. Id. ch. 110 '/, § 2-1 (Supp. 1980), as amended by 1979 ILL. LAWS, ch. 81-400, § 1.
Intestate succession is concerned with the probate estate, which does not differentiate be-
tween "marital property" and "non-marital property". Thus, if the bulk of the intestate's
property is subject to probate the pool available to the survivor might be considerably larger
than would be the case in divorce. On the other hand, the statute of descent and distribu-
tion operates only on probate assets, which may mean that many property items will not be
available to the survivor, unless survivorship or contract provisions will cause them to vest
in her or him. This distinction, however, does not apply to division upon divorce.
111. While the law of Illinois with respect to the "fraud on the forced share" is more
liberal than that of many other states, the question of whether property disposed of by
means of a particular will substitute may be reached by the surviving spouse must be adju-
dicated on a case by case basis with only generalized guidelines; see, e.g., Johnson v.
LaGrange State Bank, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978); Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill.
2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 43 I11. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d
417 (1969) (all dealing with revocable trusts). See also Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185
N.E.2d 850 (1962) (joint tenancies in intangible personalty).
For an exhaustive analysis of Illinois law with respect to the forced share, see Note, A
Response to Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank: Restoring Forced Share Protection for the
Surviving Spouse, 1980 U. ILL. L. F. 277, published after this article was written. The rec-
ommendations in the note differ markedly from the position of this article, in part because
of a basic misunderstanding of community property law.
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , § 2-1(a). (Supp. 1980). The intestate share is one-half of
the estate if there are surviving descendants, and all if there are no surviving descendants.
113. Id. ch. 110 /, § 2-8 (Smith-Hurd 1978). The forced share is one-third of the estate
if there are surviving descendants, and one-half if there are no surviving descendants.
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V. WISCONSIN: THE Go FOR BROKE APPROACH
(A) Wisconsin Law of Marital Property Rights
Wisconsin, like Illinois, is a common law state. 14 A wife has no
property interest in the earnings or acquisitions of the husband
during the union. 115 While she has a right to her own earnings, this
is still circumscribed in those cases in which she is employed by
her husband. In such a situation, even the wages paid to her are
technically his property."" Moreover, a married woman's right to
engage in a business of her own is limited except in those situa-
tions where she has been deserted by her husband or where he ne-
glects or refuses to provide for her support or the support and edu-
cation of their children. 1 7
The current Wisconsin divorce statute seems to be very liberal
on its face.118 It makes each spouse's property available for
114. See text accompanying notes 71-81 supra. Thus, the traditional property rights of
married women in Wisconsin are similar to those of Illinois discussed in the previous sec-
tion. The Wisconsin Married Women's Property Act is found in Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 246
(West 1957 & Supp. 1979-1980).
This discussion focuses on a pending bill, rather than a recent statute. The quality of the
proposed statute is outstanding and provides a model which other states would be wise to
emulate.
For an excellent discussion of Wisconsin law see a study prepared by Professor Marigold
Shire Melli of the University of Wisconsin for the National Commission on the Observance
of International Women's Year, Homemakers' Committee, M. MELLI, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
HOMEMAKERS IN WISCONSIN (LS-Wisconsin No. 50, 1977) [hereinafter cited as MaLLI, LEGAL
STATUS].
115. MELLI, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 114, at 1-2.
116. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 246.05 (West 1957).
117. Id. § 246.06 (Supp. 1979-1980). Another aspect of Wisconsin marital property rights
is that until 1960 only a married woman who was admitted to the bar could have been
appointed an assignee or receiver. Id. § 246.10, amended by 1959 Wis. LAWS ch. 595, § 41,
effective January 1, 1960.
The effect of Wisconsin's statutory equal rights provision on these sections is not entirely
clear. The statute provides in part:
Women and men shall have the same rights and privileges under the law in the
exercise of suffrage, freedom of contract, choice of residence for voting purposes,
jury service, holding office, holding and conveying property, care and custody of
children and in all other respects ....
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 246.15 (West Supp. 1979-1980). Professor Melli notes that the provisions
of § 246.05, which attribute to the husband the wages or other remuneration accruing to his
wife for labor performed for him or in his employ or payable by him, are in full force and
effect. She does, however, raise the question of constitutionality. MELLI, LEGAL STATUS,
supra note 114 at 3.
118. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.255 (West Supp. 1979-1980). This statute, under which the
reported cases have been decided, was amended and recodified effective July 20, 1979; id. §
767.255 (West Mar. 1980 Interim Ann. Serv.).
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divison."O It also provides a number of criteria which are to guide
the courts in making appropriate awards.'2 0 When one analyzes the
cases, however, the invidious presence of the title theory is imme-
diately visible. Judges are still reluctant to take "the husband's
property" and give it to the wife.12" '
119. The 1979 amendment, however, makes a distinction between donated or inherited
property and the acquisitions of marriage; as to the latter there is a presumption of equal
division. Id. § 767.255 (West Mar. 1980 Interim Ann. Serv.).
120. The present statute provides:
Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in rendering
a judgment in an action under § 767.02(1)(h), the court shall divide the property
of the parties and divest and transfer the title of any such property accordingly. A
certified copy of the portion of the judgment which affects title to real estate shall
be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the lands
so affected are situated. The court may protect and promote the best interests of
the children by setting aside a portion of the property of the parties in a separate
fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education and general welfare of any
minor children of the parties. Any property inherited by either party prior to or
during the course of the marriage shall remain the property of such party and may
not be subjected to a property division under this section except upon a finding
that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the other party or on
the children of the marriage, and in that event the court may divest the party of
such property in a fair and equitable manner. The court shall presume that all
other property except inherited property is to be divided equally between the
parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct after
considering.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West Mar. 1980 Interim Ann. Serv.) (Emphasis added).
121. See MELLI, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 114, at 16-18. A recent case decided after
Professor Melli's discussion is instructive. Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis. 2d 36, 260
N.W.2d 658 (1978), involved the dissolution of a marriage of some 22 years duration during
which the husband managed to develop a very successful business and accumulate a great
deal of property. The wife assumed the traditional role. One of the issues raised on appeal
was the division of property. The trial court made no findings as to the value of the prop-
erty and, as is usual under these circumstances, the parties' valuations differed. According
to the wife's valuation the property awarded to her had the value of $170,000 and that
awarded to the husband $710,391. According to the husband, the property awarded to the
wife had a value of $189,312 and that awarded to him $697,684. All of the income-producing
assets were awarded to the husband. Id. at 44-45, 260 N.W.2d at 662-63. Assuming the hus-
band's valuation, the wife received 21.34 percent of the total assets, whereas if the wife's
valuation were accepted, she received 19.31 percent. Thus, even under the husband's valua-
tion, he obtained almost 79 percent of the total property including all income-producing
assets, no doubt on the theory that it was his property, produced by his efforts. While the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, because of inadequate findings of fact, the court also
stated: "[ajlthough we have commented that the award to Doris appears low, we do not hold
it to be inadequate." Id. at 50, 260 N.W.2d at 665.
In a case reported after this article was written, deWitt v. deWitt, - Wis. App. -'
296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), the court refused to recognize as property the value of a professional
education, made possible by the earnings of a wife who dropped out of school to work, nor
the connected value of the good-will of a professional practice. Such factors, however, are
becoming increasingly important in the division of marital assets. See, e.g., Bartke, Louisi-
ana Reform, supra note 5, at 318-19 n. 126.
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Where the marriage ends in the death of either spouse, the re-
sulting property division depends upon the sequence of death. If
the stay-at-home spouse survives, she or he is protected by intes-
tate succession or forced share provisions. 22 If, however, the stay-
at-home spouse pre-deceases the other spouse owning no property
in her or his own right, such spouse cannot dispose of any part of
the marital accumulations acquired as a result of her or his
contributions. 128
(B) Pending Legislation: Wisconsin A.B. 1090
(1) Underlying Assumptions
Wisconsin A.B. 1090 represents a radically different approach
from that taken by any of the American common law states or the
Canadian common law provinces.12 4 The bill uses as its model the
community property laws of the seven states which have adopted
122. See MELLI, LEOAL STATUS, supra note 114, at 9-11. The spouse's intestate share is
found in WIs. STAT. ANN. § 852.01(l)(a)(1971); the election to take against the will is in §
861.05 (1971 & Supp. 1979-1980). Finally, § 861.17 deals with non-probate assets disposed of
in fraud of the forced share. Id. In this respect Wisconsin is ahead of many other states: see,
e.g., Bonapart, Estate Planning and Women: Consciousness Raising for Estate Planners, in
U. MIAMI 8TH INST. ON EST. PLANNING 10-1, 10-2 (P. Heckerling ed. 1974); Schuyler, Revoca-
ble Trusts - Spouses, Creditors and Other Predators, id. at 13-1, 13-2 to -17. Compare §
861.17 to the concept of an augmented estate in the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8
U.L.A. 109-11 (Supp. 1980). Both the Wisconsin code and the Uniform Probate Code share
the same shortcoming in that they do not take into account property passing to the surviv-
ing spouse outside of probate in the computation of the forced share. Thus, a spouse amply
provided for by will substitutes can still claim a forced share and disrupt an estate plan.
The new Michigan probate code, 1978 MICH. PuB. ACT. No. 642, effective as of July 1, 1979,
went to the other extreme of reducing the forced share by the total amount of all property
interests passing outside of probate, MIcH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 700.282(1)(b) (1980), but
without any protection against a fraud on the forced share. See Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73,
74-80, 1 N.W.2d 458, 459-61 (1942).
123. See Bartke, Ontario Bill 6, supra note 47, at 329. During the hearings on Wis. A.B.
1090, on Jan. 15, 1980, this point received considerable support.
124. The present bill is the result of untiring efforts of a small group of dedicated per-
sons. Its primary sponsor is the Wisconsin Women's Network. The original effort was under-
taken by a private committee but most of the actual drafting was done by Professor June
Weisberger of the University of Wisconsin Law School.
The first working draft, not otherwise identified, is simply dated 8-78, and formed the
basis of Professor Irish's article, Irish, supra note 7. A copy of the working draft, made
available by Professor Weisberger, is on file in the library of Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law. The completed draft was then worked on by the legislative reference bureau
of the Wisconsin legislature, and circulated to interested parties under a covering memo of
August 10, 1979. This draft is identified as LRB-0113/3 KC:tam. It then progressed due to
the dedicated efforts of Representatives Mary Lou Munts, James Rutkowski and Barbara
Ulichny as well as Senators William Bablitch and James Flynn.
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the equal management model.12' Under this model, a hybrid joint
and several management scheme exists where either spouse may
manage the community property independently except in a num-
ber of enumerated circumstances where the concurrence of both is
required. In certain circumstances, e.g., business, only the actively
engaged spouse has management powers in the day-to-day
operation.126
The outline of the proposed reform prepared by Professor Weis-
berger in April, 1979 clearly reflects this model.12 7 The outline sets
out the inequities and inadequacies of the existing law, 12  and fo-
cuses on three problem areas: (1) the inability of the stay-at-home
spouse to obtain credit in her or his own right; (2) the inability to
make lifetime gifts; and (3) the inability to direct how the accumu-
lations of the marriage are to be disposed of upon death if she or
he is the first to die.12 9
The legislative findings in the bill also articulate the need for
reform, 130 and indicate the legislature's intent to establish a form
of community property. 131 The bill codifies the general community
property premise that in managing the common estate, the spouses
owe to each other the highest degree of fair dealings and disclo-
125. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West 1970 & Supp.
1979); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1979); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (West Supp. 1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-13 to -16 (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1979).
126. See, e.g., Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1170-72, for elaboration.
A.B. 1090 uses the term "marital partnership property" rather than "community prop-
erty." This term was apparently chosen by the drafters because of the almost automatic
hostility to the concept of community property in common law states.
127. Marital Property Reform in Wisconsin, an outline prepared by Professor June
Weisberger and circulated together with the August 10, 1979, memorandum and draft.
[Hereinafter cited as Weisberger Outline).
128. Weisberger Outline, supra note 127 at 1: "A non-wage earning, non-asset owning
spouse will probably be in a better position, from a legal and economic point of view, follow-
ing divorce or legal separation, than during an ongoing marriage."
129. Id. at 1. Compare Bingaman, Equal Management of Community Property and
Equal Credit Opportunity, 13 IDAHO L. REv. 161 (1977). These problems are not addressed
by the Illinois and Ontario statutes.
130. Section 37 of Wis. A.B. 1090 would repeal chapter 766 of the Wisconsin statutes
and substitute a new chapter 766, which is the backbone of the proposed legislation. The
new chapter is then divided into section numbers parallel to the existing Wisconsin statutes.
Since most of the discussion in this article will be centered around the provisions of chapter
766, all citations to this chapter hereinafter will be to A.B. 1090 and the appropriate section
to the proposed provisions to the statutes, unless specifically indicated otherwise. The legis-
lative findings of intent are in § 766.001.
131. A.B. 1090 § 766.001(3).
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sure.' 2 Since the bill is designed to introduce new concepts and
restructure an existing institution, it is quite detailed. It includes,
for instance, an innovative choice of law rule, that where the
spouses maintain two bona fide principal residences, one of which
is within and one without the state, they are free to designate the
law of the jurisdiction which shall govern their property rights. " s
This provision recognizes that with changing perceptions of mar-
riage and the career advancement of working women, there in-
creasingly will be instances where a happily married couple will
not necessarily reside under the same roof. 3
4
(2) The Contractual Rights of the Spouses
The law concerning antenuptial and postnuptial contracts be-
tween spouses or prospective spouses is currently in a state of
flux. 3 Historically, courts have approached the validity of such
agreements differently depending upon whether they dealt with
rights upon death or rights upon divorce. In the latter case, such
agreements were held to be void as against public policy." " Al-
though recently some jurisdictions have begun to reconsider their
position, 3 7 the development of the law is very uneven. Because of
this, the drafters of the Wisconsin bill have included elaborate pro-
visions dealing with such agreements. 3 8
Any vestiges of contractual incapacity have been removed, and
antenuptual or postnuptual agreements may be executed either
before or after solemnization. 39 Following the trend of modern au-
thority, the bill stresses fairness, full disclosure and understanding
as the touchstones of enforceability, thereby excluding a priori as-
sumptions of invalidty on the basis of public policy." 0
132. Id. § 766.13(3).
133. Id. § 766.20.
134. See, e.g., Roark, Women in Science: Unequal Pay, Unsold Ideas, and, Sometimes,
Unhappy Marriages, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION Apr. 21, 1980 at 3. But see Tete, A
Critique of the Equal Management Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REv. 491, 524-26 (1979).
135. See generally Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1147-51.
136. Id. at 1149 n. 116. For a recent expression of this approach see, e.g., Connolly v.
Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 46-48 (S.D. 1978).
137. E.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976),
discussed in Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law: An Ex-
amination of Current Law and In re Marriage of Dawley, 11 U.S.F. L. Rv. 137 (1977). For
a discussion of the trend see Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 784-86 (Mo. App. 1979).
138. A.B. 1090 §§ 766.63-.69.
139. Id. § 766.63(2).
140. Id. § 766.63(10)(a) provides:
If a spouse petitions a court to enforce the provisions of an individual marriage
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(3) Property Provisions of the Bill
The substantive provisions of the bill dealing with property
rights of marriage are quite voluminous. The length and detail,
however, are necessary in that a basic change in approach is being
undertaken. Since Wisconsin courts are not familiar with commu-
nity property concepts, it is desirable and prudent for the legisla-
ture to define the concepts clearly and provide statutory answers
to most of the questions that are likely to arise. 141
(a) Types of Property
The bill provides for three types of spousal property interests:
(1) quasi-marital partnership property,1 42 (2) separate property 141
and (3) marital partnership property.14 4 The first type of property
is included both because of transitional problems, and prospec-
tively to avoid some of the injustices which have occurred in the
traditional community property states.1 45 The second and third
types of property generally follow the definitions and rules devel-
oped in community property states, but with significant refine-
ments and modifications.
Quasi-marital partnership property, a concept borrowed from
California, 46 consists of separate property which is either owned
agreement, the petitioning spouse must show:
1. That he or she made a full and fair disclosure of assets and liablities at the
time the agreement was made; and
2. That the other spouse signed the agreement freely and voluntarily with full
knowledge of his or her legal rights and responsibilities under this chapter or, in
the case of an agreement executed under sub. (9), his or her legal rights under the
laws of that jurisdiction.
The Wisconsin provision contrasts very favorably with the Louisiana statute, which re-
quires meaningless prior approval by a court in an ex parte proceeding. LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 2329 (West Supp. 1980). For a critique of this provision see Bartke, Louisiana Reform,
supra note 5, at 304-5, 324-25; Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legis-
lative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REv. 83, 90-102
(1979).
141. See, e.g., language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Willcox v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 586-87, 55 A.2d 521, 524 (1947). See Bartke, Marital Sharing,
supra note 1, at 1142-47, for a more general discussion of the hostility of some courts to the
concept of community property.
142. A.B. 1090 § 766.31(3).
143. Id. § 766.31(1).
144. Id. § 766.31(2).
145. E.g., In re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934); In re Gulstine's Estate,
166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932).
146. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4804 & 4810 (West 1970), id. §§ 1237.5, 1238, 1265, 4803,
4805, 4806 & 5132 (West Supp. 1979), CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201.5-.8, 661 & 663 (West Supp.
1979). These statutes were adopted as a legislative response to In re Thornton's Estate, 1
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by a spouse at the date at which the bill becomes operative, or
brought by the spouse from another common law state, but which
would have been characterized as marital partnership property
under the provisons of the bill. The purpose of this classification is
to give immediate and tangible relief to parties who are already
married. The provision builds upon the experiences of California
and Washington, 147 and prospectively provides for couples moving
to Wisconsin from common law jurisdictions.
Separate property is that property which either party to the
marriage owned before the solemnization or which is acquired
thereafter by lucrative title, i.e., by gift, devise or inheritance. 148
Numerous additional subsections clarify the concept and facilitate
interpretation by the courts. The only questionable provision is
one which classifies as separate property "distributions to a spouse
from a trust, including either trust income or principal. '14 9 While
the obvious purpose is to eliminate any questions as to the charac-
ter of distributions to a spouse from a trust created for her or his
benefit by a third party, the overbroad language may create
problems where a trust is created by the spouse and funded by
marital partnership property.1 50 By creating a trust with marital
partnership personalty, a spouse might try to convert the income
or corpus into separate property."
Cal.2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934) (see also In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031
(1933), in which the wife of a wealthy Montana rancher who retired in California was left
penniless). The concept basically involves property brought from a common law state which
would have been characterized as community property if acquired in California.
147. See Gilchrist, Washington Disinherits the Non-Native Wife, 46 WASH. L. REv. 283
(1971).
148. A.B. 1090 § 766.31(1).
149. Id. § 766.31(1)(b).
150. While neither spouse could create a trust of marital partnership realty unilaterally
because of the provisions of id. § 766.51(5), there does not seem to be any reason why a trust
funded with personalty should not be upheld, id. § 766.51(1). See text accompanying notes
163-76 infra for discussion of management powers.
151. The provision would be clarified if it were changed to read: "distributions to a
spouse from a trust, including either trust income or principal, created for the benefit of
such spouse by a third party, including the other spouse, or by the spouse him or herself
with separate or quasi-marital partnership property."
Although the Wisconsin bill does not address the issue, revocable trusts of community
property created by only one spouse have caused problems. For a thorough but dated dis-
cussion of revocable trusts of community property, see Johanson, Revocable Trusts and
Community Property: The Substantive Problems, 47 TEx. L. Rav. 537 (1969); Johanson,
Revocable Trusts, Widow's Election Wills, and Community Property: The Tax Problems,
47 TEx. L. RaV. 1247 (1969). For a more current discussion and criticism of the few statu-
tory models available (CAL. CIv. CODE § 5113.5 (West Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 32-906A
(Supp. 1979)) see Bartke, Community Property, Management Powers and Trusts: You Can
1980]
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Following the pattern set by the traditional community property
states, marital partnership property is defined generally as all
property which is not separate property or quasi-marital partner-
ship property. 15 2 This definition is important because it under-
scores the preference for marital partnership property, it permits
adjustment of the new system without requiring amendment.1 5 3 In
addition to the general and all-inclusive categorization, the section
lists many items specifically.1 * This listing is of tremendous prac-
tical benefit and will assist the Wisconsin bench and bar in famil-
iarizing themselves with the new property concepts.
The drafters have classified income of separate property as mari-
tal partnership property.1 55 The provisions of A.B. 1090 have modi-
fied the classification along the lines of the new Louisiana stat-
ute,156 whereby either one of the marital partners may unilaterally
withdraw the income of separate property from the marital part-
nership. The Louisiana statute makes it possible for one spouse to
withdraw the fruits of his or her separate property from the com-
munity fund, without notifying the other spouse, in order to induce
the former to continue to contribute the income of separate prop-
erty to the common pot. The proposed Wisconsin provision, how-
ever, is superior to that of Louisiana, because it requires that no-
tice of the withdrawal be given to the other spouse.'5 7
Teach Old Dogs New Tricks, 13 IDAHo L. REV. 133, 140-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Bartke, Trusts]. The whole problem is certainly deserving of legislative attention.
The drafters of the Wisconsin legislation should address this problem. There are basically
two approaches. The simplest would be to add revocable trusts to the list of those situations
which require the concurrence of both spouses. The alternative approach would be to define
statutorily the consequences of a unilateral creation of a revocable trust, both during the
continuation of the marriage (clarifying such issues as the right of revocation) and upon the
death of either the trustor or the non-trustor spouse. Notice to the non-trustor spouse of the
creation of the trust should also be required.
152. A.B. 1090 § 766.31.
153. See, e.g., Bartke, Louisiana Reform, supra note 5, at 318.
154. A.B. 1090 § 766.31(2) subsection (a) through (e).
As originally planned, property acquired during marriage, but prior to the effective date
of the bill, would have been transmuted into marital partnership property. See the August
10, 1979, draft. LRB-0113/3 KC:tam § 766.31(2). This was abandoned in part because of
possible constitutional questions. Irish, supra note 7, at 242 n.118. Some of these concerns
were voiced at the hearings on January 15, 1980. See LRB-0113/3 KC:tam § 766.31(4)(a)(1),
for an attempt to avoid some of these problems. More importantly, however, it was aban-
doned because of serious tax implications. Irish, supra note 7, at 242-45. See also Bartke,
Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1158-64, 1182-84.
155. A.B. 1090 § 766.31(2)(c)2. This classification is in accord with Spanish law; see, e.g.,
Pugh, supra note 8, at 8.
156. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West Supp. 1980).
157. A.B. 1090 § 766.68(2).
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The Wisconsin bill also contains classification provisions that
deal with specific situations. An express provision makes it clear
that record title is not determinative of the character of prop-
erty.""8 The bill includes the usual presumption that property is
marital partnership property,'" e as well as rules dealing with com-
ingling,1e° and provisions for the resolution of conflicts where one
type of property is used for the improvement of another type.16
While the provisions are quite adequate, a more specific language
dealing with marital partnership property used to improve or dis-
charge obligations on separate property would be desirable. 16 The
bill also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the interaction
of marital partnership property and existing common law concur-
rent ownerships, such as tenancies in common and particularly
joint tenancies."' Finally, there is an excellent provision dealing
with recovery for personal injuries.1' Such recovery is made mari-
tal partnership property except for the portion attributable to pain
and suffering' 5 and for recovery in the case of interspousal torts.'"
(b) Management and Control
The bill specifically indicates that both spouses own equal, undi-
vided, present and vested interests in the marital partnership
property. 167 This represents a codification of community property
158. Id. § 766.33(2).
159. Id. § 766.33. This presumption is in accord with the law in all the community prop-
erty states: Nace v. Nace, 104 Ariz. 20, 22-23, 448 P.2d 76, 78-79 (1976); Bowman v. Bow-
man, 72 Idaho 266, 268, 240 P.2d 487, 488 (1952); Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 235-36,
495 P.2d 629, 631 (1972); Graham v. Radford, 71 Wash.2d 752, 754, 431 P.2d 193, 194
(1967); CAL. CiV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1980); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (West Supp.
1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12A.(1978); Tzx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
160. A.B. 1090 § 766.33(1)(c). See, e.g., W. DR FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 8, at
124-26; Cross, Washington Community, supra note 8, at 772-73 for a general discussion of
commingling.
161. A.B. 1090 § 766.33(1)(b) (use of separate funds to increase the value of marital
partnership property); id. § 766.31(2)(c)1. (increases in value of separate property attributa-
ble to the labor, employment, efforts, industry or skill of either spouse).
162. See, e.g., Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours - Separate Title and Community Funds,
44 WASH. L. Ray. 379 (1969), reprinted in, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 137 (1969), for a general
discussion of the problem.
163. A.B. 1090 § 766.325.
164. Id. § 766.31(2)(d). See also Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1169-70. For
an extensive discussion of the law in the various community property states see Akers,
Blood and Money-Separate or Community Character of Personal Injury Recovery, 9 TEx.
TECH. L. RED. 1 (1977).
165. A.B. 1090 § 766.31(1)(k).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 766.35.
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concepts.'" Adopting such concepts, however, necessitates the
fashioning of appropriate rules for the management of the common
property. Indeed, the workability, fairness and desirability of the
scheme depend to a large extent on management powers. 169
The bill follows the best examples from the seven community
property states which have adopted a joint and several manage-
ment scheme.17 0 Each party is free to manage his or her separate
property or quasi-marital parntership property without interfer-
ence by the other, 17 1 except in certain very limited circum-
stances.1 72 As far as marital partnership property is concerned, ei-
ther party may manage it except for enumerated instances in
which both must participate.1 7 The bill requires joint action in the
acquisition, encumbrance, sale, conveyance or lease for more than
one year of marital partnership realty.1 74 Also included is a re-
quirement of joint action in undertakings of guaranty or surety-
ship 1 75 and detailed guidelines in the case of marital partnership
businesses. 176
When a marital partnership business is undertaken, the Wiscon-
sin bill does not require concurrence in daily operations, and third
parties are protected who encumber or purchase property from one
spouse in the regular course of business.177 Disposition of all or
substantially all of the assets, however, requires the concurrence of
168. Such was the law even before adoption of the present equal management statutes.
See, e.g., W. Dz FUNAK & M. VAUGHN supra note 8, at 234-45.
169. See generally Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1170-75.
170. See citations note 125 supra.
171. A.B. 1090 § 766.51(2) (separate property), id. (3) (quasi-marital partnership
property).
172. Id. § 766.51(2)"... Prior to any realization or partition, each spouse may also
exclusively manage and control any increase in value of his or her separate property . . .
subject to the good faith responsibility to the other spouse .... " Id. (3) ". . . except that
selection of a settlement of payment option respecting the benefits payable under contract,
account or plan upon retirement, termination of the plan or termination of participation in
the plan shall require the written consent of both spouses."
173. Id. § 766.51(1).
174. Id. § 766.51(5). The provision goes beyond the language of the community property
statutes and includes a mobile home used as a family residence within the definition, which
in this day and age seems highly desirable. While all seven states which embrace the equal
management principles require joinder in the encumbrance, sale, conveyance, or lease of
community realty, only three require joinder in the acquisition: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
214C.1 (1976); Nav. REV. STAT. § 123.230(4) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(4)
(Supp. 1980). This addition is highly desirable.
175. A.B. 1090 § 766.51(6). Only one community property state has this requirement,
Aiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25-214C.2 (1976).
176. A.B. 1090 § 766.61.
177. Id. § 766.61(1)(c).
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both spouses.1 78 In this area, the bill follows the best examples of
other states and improves markedly on the language used else-
where. 179 Even where joint action is required, there are three situa-
tions in which one spouse may act alone. First, the spouses may so
provide in their marriage agreement.80 Second, either spouse may
grant to the other a power of attorney.' 8 Finally, for good cause
shown, on grounds specified in the bill, a court may grant exclusive
management powers to one or the other spouse.18 2 Where joint ac-
tion is required and one of the spouses is of legal age and the other
one is a minor, the minor may validly join in any necessary
instrument. 83
As originally introduced, A.B. 1090 would have prohibited all
unilateral gifts of marital partnership property, 8 4 following the
California-Nevada-Washington model. 8 5 There seems to have been
some opposition to this and the current version'8 6 is apparently
178. Id. § 766.61(1)(a).
179. See Macdonald, The Impact of Equal Management Upon Community Property
Businesses, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 191 (1977), for a discussion of the statutes in the community
property states, although we disagree strongly with some of the conclusions. See also, Bilbe,
"Management" of Community Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV. 409, 424-26 (1979),
which discusses the provisions under the 1978 Louisiana Act which was repealed in 1979.
The provisions which are now in force, however, are substantially identical, see LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. arts. 2347, 2350 & 2352 (West. Supp. 1980).
180. A.B. 1090 § 766.63(1). The bill is not without safeguards, however, since the one
granting the right of exclusive control to the other may at any time withdraw it unilaterally.
Such provision may prevent overreaching. Thus, the Wisconsin provision by itself might
cause a spouse not to seek such an agreement, for ulterior motives, because of the right of
revocation. Id. § 766.63(3). In contrast, the Louisiana Code, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2348
(West Supp. 1980), specifically provides for irrevocability during the period stated in the
agreement and may present such a temptation.
181. A.B. 1090 § 766.53(1)(a). This provision gives spouses necessary flexibility.
182. Id. § 766.53(1)(b). The grounds are as follows:
• .. the consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained due to the physical
incapacity, mental incompetence, imprisonment or absence of that spouse or when
a spouse is substantially injured because of the other spouse's long-term financial
irresponsibility ....
This is analogous to a new and less well reasoned provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana.
LA. Civ. ANN. art. 2355 (West Supp. 1980) provides:
A spouse, in a summary proceeding, may be authorized by the court to act with-
out the concurrence of the other spouse upon showing that such action is in the
best interest of the family and that the other spouse arbitrarily refuses to concur
or that concurrence may not be obtained due to the physical incapacity, mental
incompetence, commitment, imprisonment, or absence of the other spouse.
183. A.B. 1090 § 766.53(2).
184. LRB-0113/6 KC:nm § 766.55.
185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980); NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.230(2) (1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030(2) (Supp. 1980).
186. A.B. 1090 § 766.932(1): "Whenever a spouse transfers marital partnership property
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modeled after Louisiana.' s8 The change may have been necessary
to ensure passage, but the original version was preferable from a
public policy point of view.188
The bill is especially effective where the title of record is in the
name of one spouse only.189 It specifically indicates the existence of
management rights 9 ° and provides meaningful remedies to the
spouse whose name does not appear of record,19' while protecting
the interests of bona fide purchases." 2
As a corollary to the coequal management rights, the bill specifi-
cally provides that either spouse may bring an action affecting
marital partnership property.1 93 This provision is entirely in keep-
ing with the tenor of the proposed legislation. It is also wise from a
practical point of view, since it empowers either spouse to act in a
case of an emergency, where the participation of the other spouse
may be difficult or impossible to obtain.1 94
with donative intent to a third party without obtaining the consent of the other spouse and
the transfer was not reasonable or moderate, the injured spouse may petition the court for
recovery from the donee of the property or property directly traceable to the transferred
marital partnership property..."
187. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2349 (West Supp. 1980) provides: "The donation of commu-
nity property to a third person requires the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting
alone may make a usual or customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic posi-
tion of the spouses at the time of the donation."
188. See, e.g., Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1173-74; Bartke, Trusts, supra
note 150, at 143-45 for elaboration.
189. A.B. 1090 § 766.51.
190. Id. "Record title to property by one spouse alone does not defeat the other's rights
to manage and control the property if it is marital partnership property."
191. Id. § 766.93(1): "A spouse who is improperly denied access to marital partnership
assets.. . may bring an action.. . which may include a summary proceeding to add that
spouse's name to the title, title transfer or any other appropriate remedy, or an equitable
proceeding to order the other spouse to change the record title of property located outside
this state by registering the property in both names." The last clause is particularly signifi-
cant since it would grant to Wisconsin courts equitable powers to compel registration in
those cases where one spouse used marital partnership property to acquire realty in another
state registered in his or her name only. See also, Bingaman, supra note 129, at 161-62.
192. A.B. 1090 § 766.51(4). The Wisconsin approach is opposite to that of Louisiana,
which grants exclusive management powers to the spouse in whose name the chattel is regis-
tered: "A spouse has the exclusive right to manage, alienate, encumber, or lease moveables
issued or registered in his name as provided by law." LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2351 (West
Supp. 1980). Such an approach creates an open invitation to attempt to circumvent the
statute. See Bartke, Louisiana Reform, supra note 5, at 332-33. But see Cross, Community
Property: A Comparison of the Systems in Washington and Louisiana, 39 LA. L. Ray. 479,
487 (1979).
193. A.B. 1090 § 766.57: "Any cause of action affecting the marital partnership property
may be brought by either spouse." See Cross, Washington Community, supra note 8, at 796,
for a discussion of Washington law after the adoption of the equal management concept.
194. While in the case of an emergency it would be possible to petition the court under
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(c) Liabilities to Third Parties
Dealings with third parties involve the question of how liabilities
incurred by one or the other spouse, or by both spouses jointly, are
to be discharged. While all of the community property states rec-
ognize a distinction between community and separate debts,1' " the
difference is primarily in whether the distinction is recognized only
between the spouses or whether it applies to third persons dealing
with them as well.
When drafting legislation concerning the spouse's liabilities to
third parties, there are essentially three models to choose from.
The first, following Spanish law, provides that the husband's credi-
tors can satisfy their claims from community property.'" As a re-
sult of the introduction of equal management schemes in several
states, however, this rule now applies equally to both husbands
and wives, so that as to third parties, the distinction between sepa-
rate and community obligations does not exist. 97 At the other end
of the scale there is the Washington model,"8s also adopted by Ari-
zona,' 99 which applies the distinction not only between spouses but
to the creditors as well.200 Finally, New Mexico, when modifying its
statute, adopted an intermediate position, whereby the creditors of
either spouse, if they cannot obtain satisfaction from the separate
estate of the debtor spouse, may invoke marshalling rules and
reach the debtor spouse's one-half interest in the common assets,
thereby breaching the principle of indivisibility.210
The original draft of A.B. 1090 essentially followed the New
Mexico model.' 0' After publication and the receipt of comments,
the approach was modified, and A.B. 1090 as introduced0 s3 and
A.. 1090 § 766.53(1)(b), such an action would involve additional expense and delay, which
in certain instances, such as the running of the statute of limitations, might prove fatal.
195. See generally W. Dz FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 8, at 371-89.
196. Id. at 285-86; Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So.2d 197 (La. 1973); Brockelbank,
The Creditor and the Community in Idaho, 15 LA. L. REv. 535 (1955); Prager, Persistence,
supra note 8, at 46.
197. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1980); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2345, 2357
(West Supp. 1980).
198. E.g., Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wash.2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954); Schramm v. Steele, 97
Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
199. Amz. Rav. STAT. § 25-215 (1976); Tway v. Payne, 55 Ariz. 343, 101 P.2d 455 (1940);
Cosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 P. 175 (1925).
200. See Cross, Washington Community, supra note 8, at 820-34.
201. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-9 to -11 (1978).
202. LRB-0113/3 KC:tan § 766.73(1).
203. LRB-0113/6 KC:nm § 766.71(4) & (5).
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amended20 4 fundamentally adopts the Washington-Arizona ap-
proach. The staute has elaborate provisions defining separate and
marital partnership obligations."'0 As far as separate obligations
are concerned, the bill distinguishes between those debts which
were incurred prior to marriage or prior to the effective date of the
bill, and those incurred after marriage or after the effective date of
the bill.'06 As to preexisting separate debts, the bill provides for
utilization of some, but by no means all, of the marital partnership
property for the purpose of satisfaction.07 There is, however, a
corresponding contemporaneous division for the benefit of the non-
debtor spouse. 08 Such a scheme seems to be the best solution to
spousal debts since it is designed to prevent the existence of the
so-called marital bankruptcy. 0 9
(d) Rules upon Dissolution
The bill presents a fully integrated scheme which sets forth rules
upon dissolution both by death"10 and divorce.' It recognizes the
vested nature of the property interests of both spouses in the mari-
tal partnership property and generally follows the rules of commu-
204. A.B. 1090 § 766.71(4) & (5).
205. Id. § 766.71(2) (separate debts) and (3) (marital partnership debts). Debts are de-
fined broadly in subsection (1). They include not only contractual debts but also tortious
obligations (id. § 766.71(2)(g)) which, depending on their character, may be dischargeable
either from separate or marital property assets.
206. Id. § 766.71(4) (pre-existing separate debts) and (5) (separate debts incurred after
marriage or after effective date of bill).
207. Id. § 766.71(4) (the marital partnership property which is attributable to the earn-
ings or efforts of the nondebtor spouse or to the income of the nondebtor spouse's separate
property is not available for the satisfaction purpose).
208. Id. § 766.75 (when marital partnership property is levied upon for the satisfaction
of separate debts the nondebtor spouse has one year within which to petition a court to
have marital partnership property, equal in value to that seized, set aside to him or her as
his or her separate property). Additional remedies would be provided by id. § 766.71(7) &
(8).
209. The term marital bankruptcy was used extensively in the State of Washington to
describe the situation of an indebted party marrying and thereby precluding creditors from
satisfying their obligations. Such a state of affairs was terminated by the legislature in 1969
when it adopted WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (Supp. 1980), discussed in Note, 45
WASH. L. REv. 191 (1970). See also Cross, Washington Community, supra note 8, at 829-34.
A similar statute terminating "marital bankruptcy" has been adopted in Arizona. Amiz.
Rav. STAT. § 25-215B (1976).
210. A.B. 1090 §§ 54-71 would amend various provisions of the probate code to corre-
spond to the changes in the property rights of the spouses.
211. Id. §§ 50 & 51. Section 50 would add provisions, to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255,
designed to facilitate compensating transfers from one spouse to the other in order to bal-
ance the books on marital partnership property. Section 51 would make it clear that upon
divorce, quasi-marital partnership property is to be treated as marital partnership property.
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nity property states. Each spouse is given full testamentary powers
over his or her share of the common assets. 12 A.B. 1090218 also
incorporates the Washington community property agreement,"'"
which might make it possible for the spouses in many instances to
avoid probate.21
For transitional reasons, and undoubtedly because of familiarity
with the concept, the forced share in the separate property of the
other spouse is retained.216 The quasi-marital partnership property
is subject to the rules applicable to marital partnership property
upon death. The survivor, however, must affirmatively elect to
have it so treated.1 This gives full protection to the surviving
spouse without interfering with estate planning schemes or causing
additional tax liability.2
1 8
(C) Recapitulation
The drafters of Wisconsin A.B. 1090 have examined various mar-
ital property models and have carefully selected the best available
examples for use as the foundation of their bill. In many instances,
the Wisconsin bill is superior to the models examined. This effort
is particularly significant since it represents the first serious at-
tempt to introduce the concept of sharing the economic fruits of
marriage in one of the common law states.' The bill focuses upon
212. Id. § 59, which would add § 861.01 to the Wisconsin statutes. This section would
also make it clear that the decedent has full testamentary power over his or her quasi-
marital partnership property unless the other spouse exercises the election granted by the
bill.
213. Id. § 62, which would repeal and recreate § 861.05 of the statutes.
214. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.120 (1963).
215. See Cross, Washington Community, supra note 8, at 798-802, for a discussion of
the Washington community property agreement. See also Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra
note 1, at 1141-42.
216. A.B. 1090 § 61, which would amend § 861.03 of the statutes. This forced share has
to be affirmatively elected pursuant to the provisions of id. § 62, which would amend §
861.05 of the statutes.
217. Id. § 60, which would add new section 861.015 to the statutes. Such election must
be made within six months of the date of death unless extended by an order of a court on
the grounds stated in the bill under subsection (2)(c).
218. This may permit a surviving spouse and her or his legal advisors to fine tune the
marital deduction after death, by deciding whether to make the election and thus increase
the marital deduction, or waive the election and lower the survivor's gross estate. Sec. Tress.
Rags. § 20.2056(e)-1(a)(3) (1958).
219. The enactment in the 1940's of so-called community property statutes in several of
the common law states represented tax gimmicks rather than considered attempts at im-
proving the economic side of marriage. See, e.g., W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 8,
at 89-91.
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actual problems rather than symptoms, and would provide married
persons in the state with an integrated scheme governing their
property rights during the marital relationship as well as upon ter-
mination of the relationship by death or divorce. It would formal-
ize their rights and obligations not only as to each other but also
with respect to third parties.
(D) Alternate Proposals
Some members of the Committee on Marital Property Reform of
the Wisconsin bar recently have circulated an alternative proposal
to A.B. 1090.220 This proposal clearly indicates the danger facing
those who advocate reform."' The proposal retains many of the
findings of fact and statements of purpose contained in A.B. 1090,
but with critical changes .23  The result is to combine a statement
of purpose that supports equality with a substantive framework
that fails to effect that equality. The proposal eliminates the con-
cept of marriage as a partnership; it claims, instead, to recognize
and protect the economic interests of the spouses without changing
the economic conception of the marriage relationship.223 The con-
cept of co-ownership and contemporaneous sharing of the eco-
220. The draft of the alternate proposal was sent to the authors by Prof. Weisberger. It
is dated 8/29/80 and only identified as "Proposed State Bar Alternative to Marital Partner-
ship Property Bill." [Hereinafter cited as Bar Proposal with the appropriate section num-
ber). It consists of proposed changes or additions to the Wisconsin statutes, using the num-
bering of the statutes themselves. Copies are on file in the Loyola University of Chicago Law
Library.
221. The path of reform is always difficult and objections by those trying to preserve the
status quo are generally couched in terms of the existing institutions being either ordained
by supernatural powers or somehow created by impersonal forces of nature. See, e.g.,
Prager, Persistence, supra note 8, at 11-21, for this kind of attitude toward either retention
or amendment of community property during the constitutional convention of 1849 and
during the legislative hearings on the amendments in 1971-72. Similarly, for outraged objec-
tions to the final amendment of the Louisiana system from those who predict that the very
foundations of organized society will crumble, see Pascal, Louisiana's 1978 Matrimonial Re-
gimes Legislation, 53 TuL. L. REv. 105 (1978); Tete, A Critique of the Equal Management
Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REv. 491 (1979). See also concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-42 (1873).
222. Bar Proposal, supra note 220 § 766.001.
223. Id. § 766.001(1). All references to property rights are eliminated and the recital that
"marriage is a partnership of equals" is changed to read that "marriage is a community of
equals." The word "community" in this context is vague and less descriptive than "partner-
ship." Perhaps the drafters wish to insure that equality of property rights will not be a
consequence of their pretension of reform.
Similarly in § 766.001(2) the references to property system and partnership system are
eliminated and are substituted by the words "laws of this state" and "changes contained in
this Chapter."
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nomic gains of the union is not recognized.
In regard to marital property and death of a spouse, the proposal
makes no provision for the propertyless spouse who dies first. She
or he still has no capacity to direct the disposal of a part of the
accumulations of the marriage. 224 The proposal also suggests minor
amendments to the forced share provision, increasing the share
from one-third to one-half of the net probate estate.2 5 This, how-
ever, still applies only to probate assets and has only partial safe-
guards in those situations where will substitutes are used to defeat
the rights of the survivor. 226
One section of the proposal indicates that either spouse has an
equal obligation to support the other in accordance with his or her
ability to contribute money or services.2  There is no prescribed
mechanism, however, for adjusting this obligation and the obliga-
tion stated in another provision that the parties are jointly and
severally liable for any debts contracted or incurred by either for
the reasonable and necessary expenses of either spouse or their mi-
nor children.2 8 There is also a quaint provision whereby the prop-
ertyless spouse may incur debts which must be paid by the other
spouse, not to exceed $5,000.229 How this particular maximum
figure was arrived at is not disclosed. There is no relationship be-
224. See text to notes 139-43 supra and the references to the outline prepared by Pro-
fessor Weisberger.
225. Bar Proposal, supra note 220 § 861.05(1).
226. Id. "The elective share consists of one-half of the net probate estate, reduced by
any property given outright to the spouse under the decedent's will. ... See note 135
supra for elaboration.
227. Id. § 766.13(2): "Husband and wife owe to each other mutual support. Each spouse
has an equal obligation to support the other spouse in accordance with his or her ability to
contribute money or services which are necessary for the adequate support of the other
spouse. Each parent spouse has an equal obligation to support his or her minor children."
228. Id. § 766.51(2). Besides the general provision, eight subsections ((a) through (h))
give specific examples of such necessaries.
229. Id. § 766.51(3)(a): "In addition to sub. (2), and regardless of § 422.305, if a creditor
has filed and mailed a credit statement provided in para. (c) and (d), a spouse shall be
jointly and severally liable for the payment of debts contracted or incurred by the other
spouse in consumer transactions as defined in § 421.301(13), whether or not for necessaries,
provided in this section. The aggregate liability of the non-contracting spouse under this
subsection shall not exceed $5,000 . .. ."
This proposal is somewhat reminiscent of, although less generous than, that made several
years ago by Professor Pascal in his attempt to forestall the reforms of the community prop-
erty system of Louisiana. His proposal was that if one spouse had less than perhaps 20
percent of the combined incomes of both, she or he should be entitled to demand enough
from the other to raise this total to that particular percentage. Pascal, Updating Louisiana's
Community of Gains, 49 Tut.. L. REv. 555, 570 (1975); for a criticism of this proposal see
Bartke, Community Reform, supra note 5, at 235 n.126.
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tween this figure and the economic conditions of the spouses. Fur-
thermore, this figure is presumably cumulative,2 3 0 and once ex-
hausted during the marriage, the provision becomes inoperative.2 3,
There is also a provision granting to spouses during marriage the
right to a division of assets similar to the divorce provisions.3 2
Why such a potentially disruptive action is superior to contempo-
raneous sharing is not explained. It may be based on an assump-
tion that it will either not be enacted, or else it will be seldom
used. Finally, the section provides that property once divided in
this fashion shall not be subject to another division under the sec-
tion.2 There is, however, no cross-reference of this section to the
forced share provisions, so that the less affluent spouse could engi-
neer a divison shortly before the death of the other spouse, and
then claim a forced share also.au
The whole proposal is clearly ill-judged and a blatant attempt to
try to avoid coming to grips with the economic side of marriage. It
is clearly intended to confuse the issues and blunt the attempts of
those who are trying to rationalize the law of Wisconsin and bring
a measure of justice to the marriage relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preambles to the Wisconsin bill and to the Ontario statute
are not very different in their recited legislative intent. The Wis-
consin bill, however, goes on to achieve its stated intent while the
230. Bar Proposal, supra note 220 § 766.51(3)(e): "The aggregate amount the non-con-
tracting spouse's liability under para. (a) shall be reduced by involuntary payments made by
the non-contracting spouse, in an amount equal to the lesser of: (i) the amount of the invol-
untary payment, (ii) the amount claimed on the filed credit statement of the creditor being
paid, and (iii) $5,000 reduced by the amounts claimed on other credit statements having
priority to the credit statement of the creditor involuntarily being paid."
Because the amount is reduced only by involuntary payments, the generous spouse may
be subject to the provision for years, while the selfish one may defeat the provision by forc-
ing creditors to start collections for necessaries, thus rapidly exhausting the $5,000
allowance.
231. Furthermore, since this amount apparently also is being diminished by any pay-
ments on necessaries, the careful non-earning spouse who tries to minimize her or his ex-
penditures will very shortly be denied any discretionary expenditures. On the other hand,
the spendthrift spouse will be rewarded to the extent of $5,000. This may well be an induce-
ment to a non-earning spouse to incur debts up to the $5,000 limit. Furthermore, we fail to
perceive the public policy behind the provision which penalizes the thrifty spouse and re-
wards the spendthrift one.
232. Bar Proposal, supra note 220 § 767.077. For the text of the divorce statute see note
132 supra.
233. Id. § 767.077(3).
234. Id.
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Ontario statute does not. The rhetoric of partnership in the Onta-
rio statute is empty and almost dishonest when the substantive
content of the statute is analyzed. The act applies only to dissolu-
tion by divorce and has no effect whatsoever during the existence
of the marriage or upon death of the spouse. Furthermore, even in
the context of divorce it does not approximate a partnership of
equals.
The Illinois approach, following the Uniform Act, is considerably
better than the Ontario statute but is still preoccupied with symp-
toms rather than causes. Since it applies to divorce only, it does
nothing for the stay-at-home spouse during the continuation of the
marriage. There is no integration with statutes applicable upon
death, and under certain circumstances the stay-at-home spouse
may be treated more generously upon divorce than as a widow or
widower. Finally, the statutory provision for the survivor can be
defeated by lifetime transfers which do not deprive the transferor
spouse of the economic benefits and use of the property. Because
of all of these shortcomings the Illinois approach, which is similar
to that of many other states, is only a temporary rather than a long
range solution.
The Wisconsin bill follows its well-intentioned preamble with a
carefully thought out, well-drafted and comprehensive statutory
scheme that addresses the underlying causes of the present inequi-
ties. It discards the nonsystem of the Married Women's Property
Acts and instead creates a true system of community property that
is superior to any of the eight models now in existence. It has the
necessary flexibility to permit the spouses to agree upon and divide
their tasks and roles in and outside the home without the fear of a
denial of property rights because of the choices made.80 The pre-
sent law does not do this.
Wisconsin A.B. 1090 hopefully will be enacted into law in the
forthcoming session of the legislature. It represents an excellent
model for other common law states. Some of the community prop-
erty jurisdictions also may profitably peruse its provisions and im-
prove their own statutory schemes. The commissioners on uniform
state laws have appointed a committee of distinguished legal schol-
ars and practitioners and entrusted them with the task of drafting
a uniform or model marital property regime statute.8 6 In the Wis-
235. See Bartke, Marital Sharing, supra note 1, at 1132-34; Bartke, Marital Property,
supra note 1, at 80-81, for elaboration.
236. The term regime in this context is borrowed from the civil law and denotes the
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consin bill the members of the committee have a model worthy of
emulation which they would be wise to consider in their
deliberations.
complex of rules governing the property rights of married persons during the existence of
the marital relationship and upon termination, between themselves and with respect to
third parties. A good definition is contained in the Louisiana Code, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2325 (West Supp. 1980): "A matrimonial regime is a system of principles and rules gov-
erning the ownership and management of the property of married persons as between them-
selves and toward third persons."
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